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INTRODUCTION 
We all carry within us our places of exile, our crimes and our 
ravages. But our task is not to unleash them on the world; it is to 
fight them in ourselves and others.  
—Albert Camus1 
In 1932 the Soviet Union revived its policy of propiska to control the 
internal movements of its population.2 Propiska was a system restricting 
the movement and domicile of Soviet citizens.3 As a supplement to the 
propiska system, undesirables were exiled from major cities.4 The exiles 
were instructed not to live within one hundred kilometers of designated 
cities within the Soviet Union.5 The undesirables exiled to the 101st 
kilometer included criminals, homeless persons, prostitutes, and political 
dissidents.6 One of the last great purges to the 101st kilometer 
accompanied the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, as the Soviet Union 
sought to project a positive image of its capital city to the world 
community.7 The practice gave rise to the expression, “Taken to the 101st 
kilometer” which is still a harrowing phrase in Russia and other former 
Soviet states.8 Propiska passport and registration requirements enforced 
these population relocation programs.9 
 
 
 1. ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL ix (Vintage Books 1956). 
 2. Tova Höjdestrand, The Soviet-Russian Production of Homelessness, ANTHROBASE (2003), 
http://www.anthrobase.org/Txt/H/Hoejdestrand_T_01.htm (“The Soviet propiska system was 
established by a decree by Stalin of 27th December 1932, as an instrument for the state to restrict the 
mass immigration to the large cities that was caused by expanding urban industrialisation and rural 
mass famine.” (citations omitted)); see also Noah Rubins, The Demise and Resurrection of the 
Propiska: Freedom of Movement in the Russian Federation, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 545 (1998). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Nora FitzGerald, Russians View Fate of Exiles, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 21, 2005, at 9. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Matt Bivens, Looks More Like the KGB than TBS, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1994, at C3. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Rubins, supra note 2, at 546 n.4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/3
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Members of exile communities lived in a social “abyss” where people 
were separated from their families, friends, and the only places they had 
ever known.10 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resultant end 
of banishing persons to the 101st kilometer,11 former exiles have struggled 
to reintegrate into a society that they were forced to leave so long ago.12 
The Soviet Union’s policy of expelling undesirable populations from 
designated areas is a rare modern example of mass banishment. While not 
as explicit as the Soviet practice, the various regimes set up in the United 
States to control the living arrangements of sex offenders bear striking 
resemblance to the exile made possible by the propiska system.13  
Across America, states, localities, and private communities are 
debating and implementing laws to limit the places where convicted sex 
offenders may reside.14 Twenty states15 and hundreds of localities have 
adopted sex offender residency restrictions.16 Bills to establish residency 
restrictions are currently pending in another twelve states.17 Given the 
 
 
 10. FitzGerald, supra note 4, at 9. 
 11. While banishment to the 101st kilometer fell out of favor after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the underlying policy of propiska has continued to the present day in some former Soviet 
states. See, e.g., Kacjaryna Bulanava, Belarus to Abolish ‘Propiska’ (European Radio for Belarus 
broadcast Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.belradio.fm/en/4/reports/514/?tpl=208; Rubins, supra note 2, at 
545. 
 12. FitzGerald, supra note 4, at 9. 
 13. While I describe the similarities in the practice of banishment to the 101st kilometer with 
modern work and residency restrictions on sex offenders, there are notable differences. Many of those 
sent to the 101st kilometer were not criminals at all—they were just victims of oppression by the 
Soviet government. Also, many in the criminal population were convicted of political crimes. 
Consequently, the communities at the 101st kilometer had different populations than those in sex 
offender enclaves in the United States. The analogy between the two situations is helpful, however, in 
understanding the effects of creating communities of the banished. While there are important 
differences between the populations of these two cases, many of the patterns observed in people living 
at the 101st kilometer are already beginning to emerge in states that have adopted aggressive work and 
residency restrictions on sex offenders. See infra notes 247–63 and accompanying text. 
 14. No Easy Answers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 102–20, http://hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907; see 
infra notes 172–205 and accompanying text. 
 15. ALA. CODE § 15-20-26 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128 (2006); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 3003.5 (West Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112 (Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 794.065 (West Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
8329 (Supp. 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.3(b-5) (West 2002 & Supp. 2006); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-42-4-11(C) (West Supp. 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1 
(2004 & Supp. 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.735 (West Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-
33-25 (2004 & Supp. 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.147 (Supp. 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–208.16 
(Supp. 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A) (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 
(West 2004 & Supp. 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 144.642 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 40-39-211 (Supp. 2005) [hereinafter, collectively, “Residency Restriction Statutes”]. 
 16. See infra notes 172–205 and accompanying text. 
 17. H.R. 2380, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006); H.R. 1089, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Colo. 2006); S. 12, 114th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006); S. 506, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. 
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recent development of residency restriction laws and a political 
environment toxic to sex offenders,18 the number of states and localities 
with residency restriction laws will likely continue to grow.19 
The typical residency regulation establishes an “exclusion zone”20 
around schools, child care facilities, parks, and/or other locations where 
children are commonly found.21 The exclusion zone usually requires that a 
sex offender live at least 500 to 2,500 feet from any location listed as 
protected.22 A single exclusion zone affects just a small geographic area. 
However, the aggregate effect of the many exclusion zones adopted at the 
state, local, and neighborhood levels can prevent sex offenders from living 
in entire cities, towns, and communities.23 Further, when one jurisdiction 
restricts the residency of its sex offenders by creating exclusion zones, 
neighboring communities are pressured to follow suit to avoid becoming a 
haven for local sex offenders.24 The result is an emerging race-to-the-
bottom pattern whereby communities are moving to prevent sex offenders 
from flocking to their exclusion-zone-free municipalities.25  
In this Article, I argue that the establishment of exclusion zones by 
states and localities is a form of banishment that I have termed “internal 
exile.”26 Internal exile is an uncommon practice in modern developed 
societies. Consequently, the increasing emergence of exclusion zones is a 
development that could fundamentally alter basic principles of the 
American criminal justice system.  
An examination of the connections between banishment and exclusion 
zones is essential to effective policymaking for several reasons. First, from 
a doctrinal standpoint, if exclusion zone laws are found to “resemble” 
 
 
(Kan. 2006); H.D. 942, 421st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006); H.R. 889, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. 
Sess. (Mass. 2005); S. 867, 99th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2006); Assemb. 639, 212th Leg. (N.J. 
2006); Assemb. 9428, 229th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006); H.R. 7621, 2005–2006 Leg. Sess. (R.I. 2006); 
H.R. 4323, Gen. Assemb., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2006); H.R. 1864, Leg. Sess. 80R (Tex. 2007). 
 18. ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE 
OF THE PREVENTATIVE STATE 2–3 (2006). 
 19. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).  
 20. “Exclusion zone” is a term used by Wayne Logan to describe sex offender residency 
restrictions. Id. at 11. To my knowledge, this term has not been adopted by policymakers or judges. 
Nonetheless, I believe it is a good shorthand term to describe residency restrictions. Consequently, I 
use the terms “exclusion zone” interchangeably with “residency restrictions” throughout this Article. 
 21. See Residency Restriction Statutes, supra note 15. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See infra notes 226–63 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 301–09 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 301–09 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/3
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banishment, then the laws will be presumed punitive in nature.27 If the 
laws are punitive in nature, then they cannot normally be applied 
retroactively (as most of the exclusion laws are), double jeopardy 
challenges are viable, due process claims are strengthened, cruel and 
unusual punishment claims may succeed, and other constitutional 
protections are heightened. If, however, legislatures are successful in 
portraying exclusion zones as entirely regulatory, then the ability to zone 
out any group of undesirables in America becomes a legal possibility.28 In 
the United States, the only group targeted by exclusion zone laws so far 
has been sex offenders, easily one of the most unpopular populations in 
the nation.29 However, the legal arguments in support of sex offender 
exclusion zone laws could apply to numerous other outcast populations as 
well.30 
Second, from a policy perspective, the degree to which exclusion zones 
resemble exile allows us to learn from prior experiences with internal exile 
systems. The Soviet practice of exiling undesirables to the 101st kilometer 
provides a rare example of internal exile by a modern developed society. 
As a result, I draw substantially from the Soviet experience to understand 
the nature of internal banishment and its consequences. 
Third, banishment is a unique punishment because of the social 
signaling it represents. Total social ostracization and isolation, without the 
possibility of reassimilation, is a punishment that carries a different set of 
assumptions and goals than a typical criminal sentence. By casting out sex 
offenders in response to a political environment charged with hysteria and 
fear, we are in danger of undermining the basic principles of our 
democratic government. 
This Article is structured as follows: Part I explores the history and law 
of banishment as a form of punishment in the West generally and then 
specifically in the United States. Part II discusses the development of sex 
 
 
 27. While courts addressing the constitutionality of exclusion zones have focused on whether 
exclusion zones are, in and of themselves, forms of banishment, the traditional test is whether a state 
sanction resembles banishment. People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (Kuehn, J., 
dissenting). For purposes of this Article, the difference is not particularly important because I think the 
evidence supports the contention that exclusion zones not only resemble banishment, but are a form of 
banishment as well. 
 28. See infra notes 300–01 and accompanying text. 
 29. Bret R. Hobson, Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep Convicted Sex Offenders 
Away from Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961, 962 (2006) (“[L]egislators often expediently enact new 
laws targeted at a most unpopular group—convicted sex offenders.”); Charles Toutant, Zoning Out Sex 
Offenders, N.J. L.J., Nov. 21, 2005, at 6 (noting that residency restrictions are typically implemented 
with “zero opposition, since sex offenders are the pariahs of modern society”). 
 30. Logan, supra note 19, at 3. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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offender exclusion zone laws and judicial responses to those laws. Part III 
identifies the connections between the historical practices of banishment 
discussed in Part I and the new exclusion zone laws reviewed in Part II. 
Part IV shows how these connections ultimately raise substantial legal, 
policy, and ethical problems for residency restrictions on sex offenders. I 
conclude by looking to the future of sex offender laws in America. 
I. BANISHMENT AS PUNISHMENT  
And, I know that exiles feed themselves on hope.  
—Aeschylus31 
Banishment as punishment has a long history in Western societies.32 In 
a sense, most modern punishments are a form of banishment. Prisons exile 
inmates to controlled environments for a term of years. Halfway houses 
facilitate reentry from the exiled world into the mainstream population. 
Even the death penalty seeks to permanently “banish” a convict from 
society. Gone are the days of corporal punishment, shaming, and other 
punishments that do not isolate convicts for a period of time.33  
While punishments that have the effect of banishing criminals 
dominate Western penal systems, banishment itself has fallen into strong 
disfavor in America.34 Only a handful of states allow banishment as a form 
of punishment.35 Even among those states that permit banishment, the 
practice is severely constrained in process and substance. Many states 
actually explicitly prohibit banishment in their constitutions.36 
Despite the prevalence of banishment-like punishments in Western 
jurisprudence, there is very little scholarship on the subject.37 There is also 
very little reported case law related to exile as punishment.38 The dearth of 
case law is not surprising, however, because banishment in the United 
 
 
 31. AESCHYLUS, AGAMEMNON 65 (William R. Link trans., Bauhan ed. 1981). 
 32. See infra notes 41–150 and accompanying text. 
 33. While shaming punishments have had a limited revival in the United States in recent years, 
such schemes were much more common during colonial times. See Donald Braman, Punishment and 
Accountability: Understanding and Reforming Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
1143, 1187 (2006). 
 34. See infra notes 87–150 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 37. Wm. Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Abolition 
Under the First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 456 (1998) (“There 
is a myriad of reasons why so little scholarship has been devoted to banishment.”). 
 38. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/3
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States is most often found as a condition for probation or parole.39 
Convicts infrequently challenge probation and parole conditions for fear 
that they will be denied release.40 When there is a challenge, it is rarely 
fruitful for the convict because authorities are given wide deference in 
probation and parole decisions.41 
I have identified three major periods in banishment history: expulsion, 
prison colonies, and internal exile. In this section, I discuss each of these 
periods and conclude by discussing the history and law of banishment as 
punishment in the United States. 
A. Expulsion 
Banishment in its early form was the expulsion of a person from a 
community or sovereign area. Ordinarily, as long as the banished person 
remained outside of that community or sovereign area, he or she was free 
from any further punishment. The banishment could be for a term of time 
or a lifetime of exile. I refer to this historical banishment as “expulsion” 
because the emphasis was on removing an undesirable person from a 
given community. 
At least insofar as Western culture is derived from Christian thought, 
one could say that punishment in our society began with banishment from 
the Garden of Eden.42 Expulsion has been used by governmental 
authorities since the time of the Code of Hammurabi in Babylon.43 Under 
the Code of Hammurabi, expulsion was the punishment for incest with 
one’s own daughter.44 Under Mosiac law, manslaughter was punishable by 
expulsion.45 In Ancient Greece, murderers were often sentenced to 
expulsion, although other punishments could apply as well.46 Forced exile 
for a period of ten years was imposed in Athens for any citizen who posed 
 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Jason S. Alloy, Note, “158-County Banishment” in Georgia: Constitutional Implications 
Under the State Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel, 36 GA. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2002). 
 43. James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 29, 48 (1996); Snider, supra note 37, at 459. 
 44. Alloy, supra note 42, at 1085. See also, Lindgren, supra note 43, at 48; Snider, supra note 
37, at 459. 
 45. ISRAEL DRAPKIN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 77 (1989); Snider, 
supra note 37, at 459. 
 46. RONALD S. STROUD, DRAKON’S LAW ON HOMICIDE 31–64 (1968); Snider, supra note 37, at 
460. 
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a threat to the underlying political stability of the society.47 In Ancient 
Rome, expulsion was a common punishment for a variety of crimes.48 
Expulsion continued to be a common form of punishment in the 
Middle Ages in many European societies.49 Dutch and English 
governments were particularly enamored with expulsion as a 
punishment.50 In England, the practice can be traced back to the twelfth 
century.51 At that time, banishment took the form of church-protected 
sanctuary.52 A criminal was afforded the opportunity to flee to a sacred 
place to be protected from law enforcement authorities.53 If the criminal 
confessed to his or her crimes within forty days of seeking refuge, then he 
or she could take an oath to leave England and not return without leave 
from the Crown.54 The practice of banishment subject to sanctuary fell out 
of favor in the early seventeenth century because it represented a 
significant loophole in the criminal justice system in England.55 King 
James I outlawed banishment subject to sanctuary in 1623.56 
In Amsterdam, the practice of expulsion continued well after the 
English had abandoned the system. From 1650 to 1750, at least ninety-
seven percent of non-capital sentences included some form of 
banishment.57 Expulsion served the essential functions of the death penalty 
without actual execution. The convict was removed from society and 
ordered never to return. It was as though the criminal were actually dead to 
society. Further, during the Middle Ages, expulsion was literally a death 
sentence for many persons cast out into the wilderness.58 
 
 
 47. Snider, supra note 37, at 463. 
 48. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 n.23 (1963). 
 49. Lee H. Bowker, Exile, Banishment and Transportation, 24 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & 
COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 67, 67 (1980); Snider, supra note 37, at 460. 
 50. Peter Spierenburg, The Body and the State, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE 
PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 49, 62–64 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 
1995); Snider, supra note 37, at 460–61. 
 51. SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 569 (1938). 
 52. Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British Practice 
of Banishment and its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 120 (1999). 
 53. Id.; Snider, supra note 37, at 461. 
 54. Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 120. 
 55. Id. at 120–21. 
 56. Id. at 121. 
 57. Spierenburg, supra note 50, at 62; Snider, supra note 37, at 461. 
 58. Bowker, supra note 49, at 67; Snider, supra note 37, at 460. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/3
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B. Prison Colonies 
With expulsion effectively ended in England by the abandonment of 
sanctuary protection, it was unclear what should be done with the many 
criminals who would have otherwise fled. Eventually, a system of sending 
convicts to prison colonies developed.59 These prison colonies were not 
prisons in a modern sense. Instead, criminals were either free as long as 
they remained in the land to which they were exiled or they became 
indentured servants for a term of years.60 
The United States is a country that was, in part, founded by criminals 
sent to prison colonies.61 Shipping convicts overseas afforded nations the 
dual benefits of removing criminals from society while providing labor for 
their new colonies. The practice of banishing criminals to prison colonies 
was especially prominent in England, where prisons were increasingly 
viewed as barbaric.62 
For many decades, criminals were sent from England to the Americas 
on an ad hoc basis.63 The punishment was not called exile or 
banishment—it was termed “transportation.”64 The ad hoc implementation 
of convict transportation was plagued by compliance problems, as felons 
would regularly buy their way out of transportation, or merchants would 
otherwise fail to deliver the criminals to the Americas.65 
The practice became formalized and improved with the passage of the 
Transportation Act of 1718.66 The Act was the first statutory 
implementation in England of the long-standing Anglo-Saxon custom of 
banishing criminals.67 By offering public funds to ensure transportation of 
criminals, the Act eliminated the numerous loopholes that had marred the 
ad hoc system.68 After the adoption of the Transportation Act, and until 
American independence, between 30,000 and 50,000 criminals were 
banished to the Americas.69 The primary destinations for the criminals 
 
 
 59. Snider, supra note 37, at 460. 
 60. Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 123–24. 
 61. See generally COLIN A. BROWNING, THE CONVICT SHIP AND ENGLAND’S EXILES (1851). 
 62. Snider, supra note 37, at 461 (“At this period in British penological history, the prison was 
thought of as being barbaric and outmoded. As a result, the British could not countenance sending 
their fellow citizens to extended periods of penal servitude.”). 
 63. Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 123–24. 
 64. Id. at 116–17. 
 65. Id. at 123–24. 
 66. TRANSPORTATION ACT, 1718, 4 Geo., c. 11 (Eng.); Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 116. 
 67. Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 129. 
 68. Id. at 126. 
 69. A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR AMERICA: THE TRANSPORTATION OF BRITISH CONVICTS TO 
THE COLONIES 1718–1775, 26–27 (1987); Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 116. 
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were the colonies of Virginia and Maryland.70 The typical term of 
banishment was seven years, although most of the exiles never returned to 
the British Isles.71  
Transportation was an important part of the punishment structure in 
England because other available sentences were viewed as too harsh or too 
lenient for certain crimes.72 Ireland and Scotland also joined the 
formalized transportation practices and sent their criminals to the new 
world, largely under England’s direction.73 The practice was still common 
until the signing of the Declaration of Independence,74 which effectively 
blocked English ships from delivering criminals to the colonies.75 
As with expulsion, prison colonies served functions similar to capital 
punishment but without the bloodshed: 
Execution is a simple punishment, quick, effective, economical, but 
not merciful. Hence perhaps the resort to what seemed to many to 
be the next best thing—banishment. This at least satisfied the 
society from which the criminals were expelled, if no one else. 
There was no need to worry about their behavior in the future; the 
process was cheap; [and] the receiving society could usually be 
ignored . . . .76 
While the British usually ignored the effects of banishment on receiving 
societies, the use of prison colonies marked the first significant resistance 
to importation by destination nations.77 Disregard for societies receiving 
banished persons is a significant trend because it has accompanied the 
more recent forms of banishment, as noted below. 
While the nations of the British Isles had to curtail transportation 
because of the independence of the United States, the practice continued to 
 
 
 70. Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 116. 
 71. Snider, supra note 37, at 462. 
 72. Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 122 (noting that “[transportation] was an effective way of 
modulating the severity of criminal sanctions by a system that, until then, could administer punishment 
only with extreme harshness or extreme leniency”). 
 73. Snider, supra note 37, at 462. 
 74. Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 116. 
 75. Id. at 128 (“On January 11, 1776 newspaper accounts reported that transportation was 
effectively suspended whilst the country [referring to the Colonies] remains unsettled.” (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
 76. Id. at 123 (quoting A.G.L. SHAW, CONVICTS AND THE COLONIES: A STUDY OF PENAL 
TRANSPORTATION FROM GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND TO AUSTRALIA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE 
BRITISH EMPIRE 21 (1966)). 
 77. Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 128 (“The onslaught of convicts from the Old World spurred 
public alarm and apprehension in the American Colonies.”). 
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other destinations until the middle of the nineteenth century.78 Australia 
was a popular destination; almost 40,000 people were transported there 
from Ireland alone.79  
France and Russia also engaged in transportation, although to a lesser 
extent than England.80 France created colonies in New Caledonia and on 
the notorious Devil’s Island81 near French Guinea.82 Russia’s use of 
banishment did not even require that a criminal leave the country. Because 
Russia contained vast areas of undeveloped land, including Siberia, there 
was ample space to transport criminals to be banished within the same 
continent.83 Both Russia and France continued the practice of 
transportation to a limited extent until the middle of the twentieth 
century.84  
Prison colonies eventually became a geographical impossibility as the 
frontiers of the world disappeared. There was simply no habitable 
unsettled land for prisoners to be sent. Further, even if such a place 
existed, global travel became much easier, removing any guarantee that 
banished convicts would not return immediately after their initial exile.85 
While prison colonies afforded a solution preferable to previous forms of 
banishment, they became a historical relic because of the dearth of global 
real estate. 
C. Internal Exile 
Internal exile is characterized by a system banishing a person from a 
geographic area, but not from a larger sovereign territory. Prison colonies 
usually forced persons to faraway lands whereas internal exile systems 
allowed persons to remain in the original nation but with significant 
limitations. The Soviet use of internal prison colonies provided a smooth 
 
 
 78. Snider, supra note 37, at 462–63. 
 79. Id. at 464. 
 80. Id. at 463. 
 81. Operational from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, Devil’s Island was a prison used by 
France. See generally W.E. ALLISON-BOOTH, DEVILS ISLAND (Putnam 1931); RENE BELBENOIT, DRY 
GUILLOTINE (Preston Rambo trans., E.P. Dutton 1938). The conditions on the disease-ridden island 
were horrific and, like Alcatraz, escapes from the island had a mythical nature. Id. 
 82. Snider, supra note 37, at 463 n.50. 
 83. Id. at 464. 
 84. Id. at 463. 
 85. Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 129 (“In the Middle Ages, with travel being cumbersome and 
difficult, banishment from the village or county was sufficient. As travel became easier and more 
efficient, it became necessary to banish beyond the seas.”). With the ease of travel today, true 
banishment without an expectation of return is an impossibility short of sending someone to Antarctica 
or the Moon. 
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transition to systems of internal exile aided by propiska. Instead of putting 
a convict on a train to Siberia, he or she could be ordered to leave a 
protected area and join a community beyond the 101st kilometer. In 1917, 
the prison colony system was largely abolished in Russia.86 However, 
when Stalin revived the system of propiska, he combined prison colonies 
with the propiska concept.87 With the advent of exile to the 101st 
kilometer, Stalin set the groundwork for a banishment system that Russian 
leaders could use to internally exile criminals and other undesirables. 
For an internal exile system to be effective, a person’s living and travel 
arrangements had to be tightly controlled. Thus, the propiska system was 
instrumental for Soviet leaders seeking to exile people to the 101st 
kilometer because its restrictions increased compliance with the law and 
largely prevented the banished from entering restricted areas. 
Internal exile has not been practiced on a systemic level in the Western 
nations that previously used prison colony systems. Instead, with the death 
of prison colonies, prisons once again became the dominant method of 
punishing criminals.88 Prisons offered Western societies the benefits of 
banishment without the necessity of frontiers. Prisoners are forced to exist 
in separate societies, prevented from interacting with the general 
population. Just as criminals sent to Australia in eras past were forgotten 
by the society that cast them out, modern prisons too keep inmates out of 
sight and out of mind for the rest of society.  
As a result, the transition from prison colonies to internal exile was an 
aborted revolution. Prisons, rather than internal exile systems, filled the 
gap created by the impossibility of prison colonies in the modern era. 
However, as noted below, there are persuasive reasons to believe that the 
transition to internal exile systems is gaining new momentum. 
D. Banishment in the United States 
Perhaps because the founding of America was responsible for the end 
of banishment as punishment among several Western European countries, 
it should not be surprising that America has rarely used exile in its 
criminal justice system. While banishment was common in the American 
colonies, the practice fell into disfavor as a means of punishment in the 
United States as compared to the strong Anglo-Saxon tradition supporting 
 
 
 86. Snider, supra note 37, at 464. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Logan, supra note 19, at 5. 
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exile punishments.89 Currently, as many as ten states have allowed some 
form of banishment as a condition of probation or replacement for 
imprisonment.90 The primary reasons for the limited use of banishment in 
the United States are public policy objections91 and some ambiguity about 
the constitutionality of the practice.92  
While several states have experimented with banishment during the last 
150 years,93 there is no significant case law on the legal questions raised 
by the practice.94 Of the states that still allow banishment, a key distinction 
is drawn between intrastate and interstate banishment. Interstate exile 
banishes a criminal from all parts of a state whereas intrastate banishment 
permits a convict to remain in certain areas of the state.95 Even in those 
states that have few limitations on intrastate banishment, including 
Georgia, Wisconsin, and Mississippi, interstate banishment is strictly 
forbidden.96 Interstate banishment has only been permitted in the United 
States in isolated instances.97 The legality and constitutionality of 
intrastate banishment is still an open question in many jurisdictions around 
 
 
 89. Alloy, supra note 42, at 1087. 
 90. “A survey of state case law reveals that Alabama, Alaska, California, Georgia, Illinois, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Oregon, and Texas have considered intrastate banishment conditions and 
upheld them in limited circumstances, or indicated a willingness to do so.” Stephanie Smith, Civil 
Banishment of Gang Members: Circumventing Criminal Due Process Requirements?, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1461, 1481 n.143 (2000); Matthew D. Borrelli, Note, Banishment: The Constitutional and Public 
Policy Arguments Against This Revived Ancient Punishment, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 469, 469 (2003) 
(“[O]nly six states implore [banishment] as part of probationary sentences or as an alternative to jail 
time . . . .”). In addition to some of the states that Smith lists, Borrelli includes Massachusetts. Id. 
 91. Snider, supra note 37, at 466 (“The problem is that the reasoning given for the decisions is 
often void of any legal analysis and imbued with normative notions of what constitutes proper 
punishment.”).  
 92. Borrelli, supra note 90, at 469–70. 
 93. Id. at 471–72. 
In the nineteenth century, Massachusetts courts recognized the state’s power to banish 
individuals. In 1818 Georgia allowed interstate banishment, but in 1877 the Georgia 
legislature amended the state constitution to prohibit banishment beyond the limits of the 
state. In 1893, the New York legislature enacted laws permitting a judge to impose a 
discretionary sentence that included the option for banishment. . . . Since this time, a minority 
of courts sporadically has used their power to banish the accused from counties, states, and 
activities. 
Id.  
 94. Snider, supra note 37, at 456. 
 95. Borrelli, supra note 90, at 477; Alloy, supra note 42, at 1089. 
 96. Borrelli, supra note 90, at 473. 
 97. Id. at 473–74 (“[I]n 2000 Kentucky banished a man from the state for one year when a state 
court found him guilty of domestic abuse.”); Colin Miller, Banishment from Within and Without: 
Analyzing Indigenous Sentencing Under International Human Rights Standards, 80 N.D. L. REV. 253, 
255–56 (2004). 
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the United States, but the practice is so rare that case law will probably 
continue to develop slowly on the issues related to exile. 
1. Federal Law 
The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the 
legality or constitutionality of interstate or intrastate banishment 
punishments.98 However, there have been a few notable opinions which 
discuss the issue in other contexts.99 Supreme Court cases mentioning 
exile as a punishment arise in two types of cases: immigration and Ex Post 
Facto Clause cases. The reason that a discussion of banishment might arise 
in the immigration context is fairly obvious: deportation may be construed 
as a form of exile.100 The frequent discussion of banishment in ex post 
facto cases may appear anomalous. However, the examination of 
banishment as punishment in those cases stems from the discussion by 
Justice Chase of banishment in the over 200-year-old case that still 
controls Ex Post Facto Clause cases, Calder v. Bull.101 As a result of 
Justice Chase’s examination of British banishment practices in Calder, 
subsequent Courts have often rehashed the banishment part of Justice 
Chase’s opinion, analogizing exile to the matter before them.102 
One of the most recent Supreme Court opinions referring to exile as 
punishment is Smith v. Doe,103 which is explored later in this Article. 
Smith v. Doe addressed the constitutionality of Alaska’s sex offender 
registry law. In Smith, the Court noted that any resemblance between 
registry requirements and banishment was “misleading.”104 Further, the 
Court referred to banishment as when a criminal was “expelled . . . from 
the community.”105 Ultimately, the Court found the registration 
requirements constitutional because they were simply regulatory, not 
banishment.106 
 
 
 98. Snider, supra note 37, at 471. 
 99. Searching the Lexis-Nexis “U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyer’s Edition” database for 
“banish! or exile!” yielded 209 cases on September 28, 2007. However, most of those cases mention 
banishment or exile in a context other than punishment or only in passing. Only a small handful of 
cases actually address banishment or exile as punishment.  
 100. See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1987). 
 101. 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
 102. See, e.g., Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 614–15 (2003). 
 103. 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 104. Id. at 98. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 98–99. 
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Generally, the immigration cases do not offer much insight into how 
the Court will address an actual claim that banishment is unconstitutional 
because American citizens are afforded greater protection against exile. 
However, there are a small number of immigration cases related to the 
refusal of officials to allow reentry of Chinese laborer citizens that have 
some bearing on the topic of this Article.  
In United States v. Sing Tuck,107 the Supreme Court upheld a statute 
requiring a person of Chinese ethnicity seeking admission into the United 
States to submit his or her claim to an immigration officer.108 The decision 
of the immigration officer was final, and even claims of actual citizenship 
were not subject to appellate review or habeas relief unless a person could 
show actual abuse of authority by the government.109 
Applying the precedent in Sing Tuck, the Court in United States v. Ju 
Toy110 upheld a denial of habeas relief to a Chinese laborer seeking reentry 
to the United States as a citizen who had been barred entry by a 
government official without a hearing.111 The court upheld the appellate 
court’s denial of habeas relief despite a clear factual finding by the district 
court that Ju Toy was, in fact, a citizen.112 Justice Holmes’ majority 
opinion made no mention of exile or banishment. However, Justice 
Brewer in his dissent engaged in an elaborate discussion of banishment, 
deportation, and the refusal to allow entry.113 
Justice Brewer attempted to distinguish the case before him from the 
decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,114 where the Court held that 
banishment through deportation of an alien was not punishment. Justice 
Brewer argued that “it was not suggested, and indeed could not be, that the 
deportation and exile of a citizen was not punishment.”115 The dissent 
went on to discuss various definitions of banishment and some history of 
exile as punishment.116 Justice Brewer’s conclusion was that “banishment 
is a punishment . . . of the severest sort.”117  
Justice Brewer’s dissent has no value as precedent and is 
distinguishable from residency restrictions because he was considering 
 
 
 107. 194 U.S. 161 (1904). 
 108. Id. at 170. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 198 U.S. 253 (1905). 
 111. Id. at 258–59. 
 112. Id. at 263–64. 
 113. Id. at 269–80 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
 114. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 115. 198 U.S. at 269 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 269–73. 
 117. Id. at 273. 
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banishment from the entire United States. Nonetheless, his writings are the 
most significant by the Court on the issue of banishment as punishment. 
The fact that the majority opinions in the Chinese laborer cases, while still 
“good” law, are not remembered as high points in American legal 
thought118 could lend some authority to Justice Brewer’s thorough analysis 
of the issue. 
The only other Supreme Court opinion of relevance to this Article is 
the 1800 case of Cooper v. Telfair.119 The plaintiff in Cooper argued that 
the state of Georgia could not constitutionally confiscate his property 
simply because the plaintiff had joined British forces against the United 
States.120 In his opinion, Justice Cushing wrote that “[t]he right to 
confiscate and banish, in the case of an offending citizen, must belong to 
every government.”121 This clear statement has led at least one scholar to 
argue that the Supreme Court has offered a definitive ruling on the legality 
of banishment.122 However, the facts of the case are readily 
distinguishable from any modern example. The Court in Cooper held that 
the nature of the constitutional compact allowed legislatures to confiscate 
the property of and banish persons who took up arms against the United 
States.123 Such reasoning cannot be easily applied to banishment for an 
ordinary criminal offense, where the security of the country is not at stake. 
Other federal courts have provided opinions related to banishment, but 
there is no clear agreement among the decisions.124 The federal case most 
often cited by scholars and courts125 in support of the proposition that 
banishment is illegal under United States law is Dear Wing Jung v. United 
States.126 In Dear Wing Jung, the Ninth Circuit held that it was unlawful to 
allow an alien to choose banishment in exchange for a suspended prison 
sentence.127 However, like the other immigration cases at the Supreme 
Court level, Dear Wing Jung does not actually address the banishment of a 
citizen within the confines of the United States. As a result, citing it for the 
proposition that banishment is per se illegal is erroneous.128 As with 
 
 
 118. See generally Ming-sung Kuo, The Duality of Federalist Nation-Building: Two Strains of 
Chinese Immigration Cases Revisited, 67 ALA. L. REV. 27 (2003). 
 119. 4 U.S. 14 (1800).  
 120. Id. at 15. 
 121. Id. at 20. 
 122. Snider, supra note 37, at 469. 
 123. 4 U.S. at 18–20. 
 124. See infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
 125. Snider, supra note 37, at 467. 
 126. 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962). 
 127. Id. at 75–76. 
 128. Snider, supra note 37, at 468. 
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Supreme Court opinions on the issue, no clear holdings by the circuit or 
district courts have emerged to decide the legality of banishment as 
punishment. As a result, there is no established, controlling federal law on 
banishment as punishment. 
2. State Law 
At least sixteen states forbid or otherwise limit banishment in their 
constitutions.129 Some states, such as Tennessee and Maryland, limit exile 
as punishment by adding a due process requirement before someone is 
banished.130 Because of the emphasis on determinate sentencing ranges 
with specific terms of imprisonment, banishment is not part of state 
sentencing statutes.131 The lack of specific statutory or constitutional 
references to banishment in most states often leaves the questions 
surrounding exile to the courts. 
The majority of state courts that have addressed the issue hold that 
interstate banishment is against public policy.132 In the various decisions 
addressing the legality of banishment at the state level, there has been 
almost no mention of the constitutionality of the practice.133 The public 
policy rationales are often vague, but the recurring theme among state 
courts is that banishment is likely to cause discord between the 
communities doing the banishing and those receiving the banished.134 
Another common reason that state courts strike down banishment 
sentences is that the sentences lack specific statutory authorization.135 The 
Michigan Supreme Court, in State v. Baum,136 offered one of the most 
detailed explanations for why interstate banishment as a form of 
punishment should be illegal in the United States: 
 
 
 129. Id. at 465; see ALA. CONST. art. I, § 30; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 21; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 
21; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11; KAN. CONST. § 12 (amended 1972); MD. CONST. art. IV; MASS. CONST. pt. 
1, art. XII; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.H. CONST pt. 1, art. XIV; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; OHIO CONST. 
art. I, § 12; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 29; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 20; VT. CONST. ch. 
I, art. I; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5. 
 130. Snider, supra note 37, at 465. 
 131. Id. at 466. 
 132. Borrelli, supra note 90, at 477 n.58 (citing Ex parte Scarborough, 173 P.2d 825, 827 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1946); Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 957 (Mass. 1998); State v. Halverson, 154 
N.W.2d 699, 702 (Minn. 1967); State v. J.F., 621 A.2d 520, 522 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); 
People v. Marcial, 577 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); State v. Culp, 226 S.E.2d 841, 842 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1976)). 
 133. Borrelli, supra note 90, at 477–78. 
 134. See, e.g., People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1930). 
 135. Snider, supra note 32, at 467. 
 136. 231 N.W. 95 (Mich. 1930). 
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To permit one state to dump its convict criminals into another 
would entitle the state believing itself injured thereby to exercise its 
police and military power, in the interest of its own peace, safety, 
and welfare, to repel such an invasion. It would tend to incite 
dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that fundamental 
equality of political rights among the several states which is the 
basis of the Union itself.137 
For those states that allow intrastate banishment, the punishment is 
usually analogized to “buffer zone” punishments applied in the context of 
domestic abuse situations to keep abusers away from their victims.138 If 
the prosecution can connect banishment to a rehabilitative or crime 
prevention purpose, then the likelihood that the punishment will be upheld 
on appeal is increased.139 Mississippi, Florida, Wisconsin, and Oregon 
specifically require that exile facilitate rehabilitation.140 
Some states have distinguished between banishment as part of 
probation and as a condition of parole.141 When state courts have reviewed 
banishment as part of a probation plan, they have almost always held that 
the practice is illegal.142 As a condition of parole or pardon, however, the 
use of banishment has sometimes been supported, although the case law is 
sparse because convicts rarely challenge their parole conditions for fear 
that their parole will be revoked.143 
Perhaps the most unusual state in terms of banishment is Georgia. The 
Georgia Constitution expressly forbids banishment from the state.144 
However, in State v. Collett,145 the Georgia Supreme Court held that 
banishment from 158 of the state’s 159 counties was valid.146 Not 
surprisingly, prosecutors have taken advantage of the decision and have 
sought 158-county banishment for many offenders.147 The two typical 
 
 
 137. Id. at 96. 
 138. Borrelli, supra note 90, at 475. 
 139. Id. at 479–80. 
 140. Id. at 479. 
 141. Snider, supra note 37, at 466. 
 142. Id. at 471–72 (“Almost without exception, courts reviewing a plan of probation requiring a 
person to leave the state or a large geographical subdivision of the state, have found the plan to be 
illegal.”). The reason for this distinction is that as a condition of parole or pardon, banishment is an 
alternative to prison time. Thus, in such cases, banishment is viewed as a lesser of two possible 
punishments. However, as a condition of probation, banishment is viewed as increasing the overall 
amount of punishment since probation does not normally include an exile requirement. 
 143. Id. at 471.  
 144. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, para. XXI. 
 145. 208 S.E.2d 472 (Ga. 1974). 
 146. Id. at 474. 
 147. Alloy, supra note 42. 
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counties that prosecutors seek to send offenders are Ware County, “a 
remote, sparsely populated area in southern central Georgia,”148 and 
Echols County, where “[t]here are no restaurants, hotels or banks, and 
only four thousand residents in the county.”149 Since Collett, a single 
prosecutor in DeKalb County has had over 200 defendants banished to 
Echols County.150 The majority opinion in Collett did not address the fact 
that none of the defendants sentenced to 158-county banishment would 
likely choose to live in Ware or Echols County. The result of the 158-
county banishment sentences, while not technically ordering the 
defendants to leave the state, has been to cause such an exodus to occur. 
In states where the practice of banishment is of questionable legality, 
the trend among courts allowing banishment has been to call the 
punishment something other than banishment.151 This judicial sleight-of-
hand is usually accomplished by the court adopting a very narrow 
definition of what constitutes banishment.152 This feat is performed with 
relative ease because of the lack of developed case law defining the 
specific parameters of what constitutes “banishment” or “exile.” This 
ambiguity in the definition of banishment becomes prominent in reviewing 
the case law related to sex offender exclusion zones.  
II. CONTROLLING AND PUNISHING SEX OFFENDERS 
This is why some think that legislators ought to stimulate men to 
virtue and urge them forward by the motive of the noble, on the 
assumption that those who have been well advanced by the 
formation of habits will attend to such influences; and that 
punishments and penalties should be imposed on those who disobey 
and are of inferior nature, while the incurably bad should be 
completely banished. 
—Aristotle153  
Pedophiles are easy targets for politicians seeking to look tough on 
crime.154 Their crimes make front page headlines and are attacked as 
 
 
 148. Snider, supra note 37, at 455. 
 149. Alloy, supra note 42, at 1099. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Borrelli, supra note 90, at 481. 
 152. Id. 
 153. THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1180a5 to a10 (W.D. Ross trans., 1925).  
 154. Hobson, supra note 29, at 962. 
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morally incomprehensible.155 When a child is involved, the perpetrator is 
thought to be of the vilest sort.156 Media coverage of the crimes leaves 
little of the heinous details to the imagination. Bill O’Reilly has been one 
of the most vocal media members attacking legislators who are “weak” on 
sex offender issues. In admonishing those who oppose a crackdown on sex 
offenders, he recently said, “[e]very day, you guys dither around, 
thousands of children get hurt in America. Every day that local law 
enforcement doesn’t have the information it should have, predators are 
more free to rape and kill.”157 Against such a backdrop, it is a wonder that 
child molesters are not all sentenced to life in prison or death. Indeed, 
prison sentences for sex offenders have been quickly increasing in states 
across the country.158 
In the United States, imprisonment is still the most common method of 
expelling felons from society. As with banishment punishments before, 
prisons serve the punishment goals of deterrence, retribution, and 
incapacitation. They also allow societies to forget about the people living 
within the prisons as they are not forced to interact with many of the 
undesirables of American society. 
However, the cost of imprisonment for a single inmate has skyrocketed 
in the United States, making the level of incarceration in America 
potentially unsustainable.159 From an economic standpoint, alternative 
sentencing approaches make substantial sense.160 Parole also serves as an 
important safety valve to check prison overcrowding and to limit the 
overall prison population.161 Nonetheless, the cost of imprisonment of 
America’s convicts continues to grow.162 
Because they are particularly high-profile criminals, sex offenders have 
become a popular target for various alternative sentencing schemes. In the 
1990s, several states diverted convicted sex offenders to psychiatric 
facilities following imprisonment.163 The Supreme Court, in Kansas v. 
 
 
 155. Heidi Schlumpf, Bad News on the Rise, U.S. CATHOLIC, Nov. 2002, at 26. 
 156. Steven J. Wernick, Note, In Accordance With a Public Outcry: Zoning Out Sex Offenders 
Through Residence Restrictions in Florida, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1147, 1151 (2006). 
 157. The O’Reilly Factor: Talking Points Memo and Top Story (Fox News television broadcast 
Apr. 27, 2006). 
 158. Hobson, supra note 29, at 964. 
 159. Editorial, Follow Texas’ Lead in Reforming State Prisons, THE DETROIT NEWS, July 9, 2007, 
at 10A. 
 160. Alexandra Marks, In Drug War, Treatment is Back, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jul. 14, 2000, 
at 1. 
 161. Nancy Vogel, Rehab in Prison Can Cut Costs, Report Says, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at 
B1. 
 162. Editorial, supra note 159. 
 163. Hobson, supra note 29, at 963. 
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Hendricks,164 held that a Kansas statute that put sexually violent predators 
in psychiatric facilities did not raise due process or ex post facto 
concerns.165 Because of the Supreme Court’s approval of the practice, the 
medicalization of sex offender sentencing has continued into the new 
millennium.166  
Another notable sentencing development in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s was the advent of registration laws.167 These registration laws were 
supplemented by community notification provisions that alerted people 
when sex offenders moved into their neighborhoods.168 The first 
community notification law was passed in Washington in 1990.169 As with 
the registry statutes, the Supreme Court found no constitutional infirmities 
with notification statutes.170  
Failure to register became a federal crime in 2006 with the passage of 
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.171 Today, Senator John 
McCain is leading an effort to further federalize the registration 
requirements by requiring e-mail address registration for sex offenders 
nationwide.172 In the current proposal under consideration by Congress, a 
failure to register e-mail addresses would be punishable by a term of 
imprisonment up to ten years.173 
Civil commitment, registry, and notification were precursors to the 
current trend of applying residency exclusion zones to convicted sex 
offenders. The recent implementation of exclusion zones is an outgrowth 
of the sex offender registries and related community notification 
 
 
 164. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 165. Id. at 370–71. The Hendricks court held that there was no ex post facto concern because the 
purpose and effect of civil commitment is not punishment. Id. The procedural due process argument by 
the petitioner was not persuasive to the majority because of the various rules in place to ensure that 
only the most violent predators would be sent to mental institutions under the law. Id. at 356–60. 
 166. Id. As Eric Janus has noted, the statutes committing sex offenders to psychiatric facilities are 
not of recent origin. JANUS, supra note 18, at 22. In America, mental hygiene laws aimed at “sex 
psychopaths” that diverted sex offenders to mental institutions were very common in the 1930s. Id. 
However, by the early 1980s, all of these laws were either repealed or ceased being used. Id. This 
focus away from civil commitment was in large part to an overwhelming scientific consensus that the 
laws were total failures. However, only a decade later, these lessons were forgotten and a new round of 
civil commitment laws were passed. Id. at 22. 
 167. Hobson, supra note 29, at 963. 
 168. Id. 
 169. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West 2005); Recent Legislation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
787, 787 (1995). 
 170. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2003). 
 171. PUB. L. NO. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006). 
 172. Jeremy Pelofsky, Lawmakers Take Aim at Sex Offenders on Internet, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 
2007, at A1. 
 173. Id. 
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provisions.174 The advent of exclusion zones has changed the landscape of 
sex offender law in important respects. Instead of choosing between 
registered, but otherwise relatively unrestricted release, and locking up 
offenders and throwing away the key, many states are experimenting with 
a form of internal exile through the use of exclusion zones. Exclusion 
zones are often hastily drafted with little debate following a high-profile 
crime committed against a minor by a convicted sex offender.175 Below, I 
detail the state of the law in regards to sex offender exclusion zones. 
A. State and Local Efforts 
There are notable differences between various states in their sex 
offender exclusion zones. Localities have supplemented and acted in lieu 
of existing state laws, implementing their own residency restrictions. I 
offer some highlights of the twenty varied state approaches below. I 
follow the discussion of state efforts with a brief overview of the different 
local restrictions that have been adopted. 
1. States 
Alabama is a typical example of a state that has developed an exclusion 
zone policy containing several different restrictions. Alabama’s decision to 
strengthen its sex offender restrictions was driven by a July 2005 episode 
of the O’Reilly Factor176 in which Bill O’Reilly named Alabama as a state 
that does not care about sex offenders.177 One week after the episode, 
 
 
 174. Recent Legislation, 119 HARV. L. REV. 939, 939 (2006) [hereinafter Recent Legislation I]. 
David Singleton explains the interrelation between media and law passage this way: 
As the enactment dates of these statutes illustrate, sex offender residency restrictions are 
likely a response to high-profile media coverage of child abduction cases. It is probably no 
accident that passage of the first sex offender residency restrictions in 1995 followed on the 
heels of the Klaas and Kanka murders in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Prior to the Klaas 
murder, national coverage of such crimes was comparatively slight. Beginning with the Klaas 
case, however, media coverage of such crimes exploded. The increased attention to child 
abduction cases and the public outcry generated thereby likely led to passage of the first 
restrictions in 1995. Regardless of the reasons for the first restrictions, there can be little 
doubt that the highly publicized murders of Brucia and Lunsford in 2005 played a significant 
role in the spate of new sex offender residency restrictions proposed and enacted in 2005 and 
2006. 
David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture Of Fear: The Case for More 
Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 600, 
609–10 (2006). 
 175. Toutant, supra note 29, at 6; Logan, supra note 19, at 3. 
 176. The O’Reilly Factor: Factor Investigation: Which States are Soft on Child Sex Offenders? 
(Fox News television broadcast Jul. 11, 2005). 
 177. Recent Legislation I, supra note 174, at 942. 
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Governor Bob Riley “convened a special session of the legislature” to 
debate reform to Alabama’s sex offender laws.178 The result was several 
changes to Alabama’s laws, including residency restrictions for convicted 
sex offenders.179 The residency exclusion zones in Alabama apply to sex 
offenders who have committed crimes against adults as well as children.180 
Alabama has supplemented its exclusion zones with an additional 
loitering restriction.181 The anti-loitering requirement prohibits sex 
offenders from being within 500 feet of a facility with the “principal 
purpose of caring for, educating, or entertaining minors” if they have no 
legitimate reason for being there.182  
Like Alabama, Florida enacted residency restrictions after public 
outcry following three high-profile crimes allegedly committed by 
convicted sex offenders.183 Florida is one of the minority of states that 
applies residency restrictions only to those sex offenders whose crimes 
involved a minor.184 Most states with residency restrictions apply the 
exclusion zones to sex offenders even though their crimes did not involve 
children.185 
Georgia currently has one of the harshest exclusion zone laws 
nationwide.186 Georgia’s law established a 1,000 foot radius exclusion 
zone that applies to churches, bus stops, parks, playgrounds, gymnasiums, 
swimming pools, and other areas where “minors congregate.”187 The 
 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 941. 
 180. ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.; Recent Legislation I, supra note 174, at 941. 
 183. Hobson, supra note 29, at 962. Hobson described the notable cases as: 
First, eleven-year-old Carlie Brucia disappeared from Sarasota, Florida in February 2004. A 
carwash surveillance camera captured the abduction on tape. Authorities eventually charged a 
convicted sex offender with Carlie’s kidnap, rape, and strangulation. Next, nine-year-old 
Jessica Lunsford vanished from her bedroom in Homosassa, Florida on February 24, 2005, 
just over a year after Carlie’s ordeal. Police found her body buried in a neighbor’s yard nearly 
three weeks later. The authorities arrested convicted sex offender John Couey for kidnapping, 
sexually assaulting, and killing Jessica. Although he pleaded not guilty to all charges, Couey 
told investigators he buried Jessica alive after keeping her captive for days. Finally, thirteen-
year-old Sarah Lunde of Ruskin, Florida suffered a similar fate mere weeks after police 
unearthed Jessica’s corpse. Searchers found Sarah’s semi-clad, strangled body in a pond near 
her home. Prosecutors charged a convicted rapist, David Onstott, with Sarah’s abduction and 
murder. 
Id. at 962–63. See also Abby Goodnough, Florida Legislature is Near an Agreement on Sex Offenders, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005, at A14. 
 184. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.065 (West Supp. 2007). 
 185. See Residency Restriction Statutes, supra note 15. 
 186. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2006). 
 187. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (Supp. 2006). 
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Georgia law also has higher penalties than other states—a convicted sex 
offender in Georgia who knowingly violates the residency restrictions 
could face thirty years in prison.188 Early reports on the experience in 
Georgia are that a large majority of sex offenders have had to relocate 
because of the exclusion zones.189 
Iowa pushed the envelope in terms of exclusion zone radius when it 
required sex offenders to live 2,000 feet away from a school or registered 
child care facility.190 Like Florida, Iowa residency restrictions only apply 
to offenders who committed sexual crimes against minors.191 The Iowa 
law, like most other statutes, does not require an individual determination 
of dangerousness for the residency restriction to apply.192 
Louisiana’s exclusion zones include more protected areas than most 
other state statutes. In addition to the common zones around schools and 
child care centers, residency restrictions in Louisiana also apply around 
playgrounds, youth centers, public swimming pools, and video arcades.193 
Louisiana limits the sex offenders included in the statute to those who are 
“sexually violent predators,” but that population includes offenders who 
committed crimes against adults as well as children.194 
A notable development in some states is the use of Global Positioning 
System (GPS) monitoring of sex offenders. Alabama,195 California,196 and 
Florida,197 all utilize some form of monitoring to aid in enforcement of 
their exclusion zones. One of the primary goals of the GPS system is to 
provide real-time monitoring of sex offenders to see if they are in 
proximity to schools or other “danger” areas.198 However, because of the 
cost of such real-time coverage, no state has been able to actually provide 
that level of monitoring.199 
 
 
 188. Jill Young Miller, Registered Sex Offenders Ordered to Find New Homes, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., May 19, 2006, at 1A, available at 2006 WLNR 8605742. 
 189. Id. (noting that in Cobb County, there are very few places for sex offenders to live and in 
Rockdale County, forty-eight of fifty-one sex offenders registered in the county had to relocate). 
 190. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A (West 2003 & Supp. 2007). 
 191. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007). 
 192. Id. 
 193. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2007). 
 194. Id. § 14:91.1. 
 195. ALA. CODE § 15-20-25.3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); Recent Legislation I, supra note 174, at 
941. 
 196. Patt Morrison, Brainless Laws, Gutless Pols, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at A31. 
 197. Hobson, supra note 29, at 964; Robert F. Worth, Exiling Sex Offenders From Town: 
Questions About Legality and Effectiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at B6. 
 198. Brandon Bain, Spotty Track Record; Nassau Probation Department Audit Finds High-Risk 
Sex Offenders Who Wear GPS Devices Aren’t Monitored 24-7, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 25, 2006, at 
A03. 
 199. Id. 
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Arkansas is probably the biggest outlier among the states with 
exclusion zone laws. It has implemented the most narrow exclusion zone 
policy of the twenty states with such laws. The Arkansas statute uses a 
tiered risk scheme and requires an individual determination of 
dangerousness of the offender.200 Thus far, Arkansas is the only state to 
have taken a narrowly tailored approach with some measure of due 
process in its use of exclusion zones. 
2. Localities 
The number of localities considering or adopting sex offender 
restrictions continues to grow. On any given day, one can read newspapers 
across the country and usually find several communities debating sex 
offender laws. Local laws are often not publicized or available online. As a 
result, a sex offender may be accountable for knowing the local rules with 
no actual notice of those rules. This creates an expectation that a sex 
offender is able to engage in legal research into any community in which 
he or she may work, live, or visit to ensure compliance with a plethora of 
different rules. While this expectation is a legal fiction, a sex offender’s 
failure to comply with local rules can be punished by substantial fines and 
jail time. 
Because there are so many local restrictions across the nation, I only 
discuss a sampling of some of the laws in a few states. These examples 
illustrate how difficult compliance with the rules could be for a registered 
sex offender. The examples that follow also show how much uncertainty 
exists among different communities about what an exclusion zone rule 
should look like.  
Nebraska is an example of a state with no statute establishing residency 
restrictions, but with many towns and cities that have adopted residency 
restriction ordinances of their own. Cities such as La Vista, Omaha, and 
Ralston each adopted ordinances prohibiting high-risk sex offenders from 
living within 500 feet of schools.201 Nebraska towns were motivated by a 
desire to avoid becoming havens to sex offenders fleeing Iowa after Iowa 
adopted some of the most onerous restrictions in the country.202 
 
 
 200. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006). 
 201. Karen Sloan, La Vista Restricts Sex Offenders, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 17, 2006, at 
5B. 
 202. Karen Sloan, State Law Trumps Limits by Cities, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 27, 2006, at 
2A. 
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Like Nebraska, New Jersey is another state where there is no statewide 
exclusion zone law, but local communities have filled the vacuum.203 In 
New Jersey, Woolwich went further than the over 110 other towns in the 
state that have implemented exclusion zones by adopting a 2,500 foot 
exclusion zone around any school, park, playground, library, child care 
center, or house of worship for the two highest tiers of convicted sex 
offenders.204  
In Florida, over sixty cities adopted residency restrictions in the year 
after the first local ordinance was adopted.205 Most of these city 
ordinances impose a 2,000 to 2,500 foot exclusion zone around restricted 
areas, including schools, day care facilities, and playgrounds.206 Florida 
was also the site of one the more unusual restrictions on sex offenders. In 
2005, some localities banned sex offenders from public hurricane shelters, 
forcing the offenders to seek refuge in local prisons.207 Rather than quibble 
with the creation of limited exclusion zones that may leave certain parts of 
the city “unprotected,” Tampa is considering an ordinance that will simply 
prohibit sex offenders living in any part of the city.208 
To get a feeling for how many communities are considering residency 
restrictions at any given time, one can simply review news accounts of 
articles from a random month in any online news database and find scores 
of towns, counties, cities, and other communities considering sex offender 
restrictions.209 The details of each local community’s discussion vary, but 
the common message is that neighborhoods and towns across America 
want sex offenders to leave. Given the relative newness of local 
implementation of these laws, the trend toward community laws is likely 
to continue for some time. 
 
 
 203. Logan, supra note 19, at 9–10. 
 204. Anna Nguyen, Woolwich OKs Limits on Sex Offenders, COURIER POST (Cherry Hill, N.J.), 
May 16, 2006, at 1G. 
 205. Todd Leskanic, More Cities Limit Residences of Sex Offenders, TAMPA TRIB., May 14, 2006, 
at 1, available at 2006 WLNR 8468968. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Hobson, supra note 29, at 963–64. 
 208. Janet Zink, Tampa Wants to Keep Sex Offenders Outside City Limits, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES 
(Fla.), Jan. 19, 2007, at 1A. 
 209. For example, I reviewed articles in the All News database on Lexis-Nexis with the search: 
“(city or community or localit! or town or township or county) w/30 (law or ordinance or statute or 
rule) w/30 (sex offender) w/30 (residency or work) and date aft 10/1/2006 and date bef 11/1/2006.” 
The search yields 101 articles. Although many deal with related issues and laws already in effect, the 
search shows the array of communities debating sex offender restrictions. Because not all local 
deliberations are reported, many smaller newspapers are not available on Lexis, and my search terms 
may have missed some articles. The number of communities outlined in those articles is quite likely 
lower than the actual number of communities that considered residency or work restrictions on sex 
offenders during October 2006. 
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B. Judicial Responses to State and Local Efforts 
There are several constitutional arguments that plaintiffs have used to 
challenge the validity of living restrictions on sex offenders. The primary 
constitutional arguments used against exclusion zones are that they violate 
the doctrine of substantive due process, violate procedural due process 
rights of sex offenders, infringe upon the right to intrastate travel, compel 
sex offenders to unconstitutionally incriminate themselves, and violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause. So far, every highest appellate court that has 
considered the legality and constitutionality of sex offender exclusion 
zones has upheld the statutes authorizing the exclusion zones. 
The Eighth Circuit is the only federal appellate court to assess the 
constitutionality of the various state and locality residency restrictions on 
sex offenders. In Doe v. Miller,210 a panel of three Eighth Circuit judges 
reversed the judgment of the district court211 and upheld Iowa’s sex 
offender restrictions.212 The critical portion of Iowa’s law reads: “A person 
shall not reside within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a 
public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a child care 
facility.”213 For purposes of the statute, a “person” is someone “who has 
committed a criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, 
sexually violent offense, or other relevant offense that involved a 
minor.”214 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment to strike down 
the statute on several grounds. Among the arguments against the statute 
before the Eighth Circuit were that it: (1) violates the doctrine of 
substantive due process; (2) violates the procedural due process rights of 
sex offenders; (3) infringes on the right to intrastate travel (the court treats 
this as part of the substantive due process discussion); (4) compels sex 
offenders to unconstitutionally incriminate themselves; and (5) violates the 
Ex Post Facto Clause.215 Ultimately, the majority opinion rejected all of 
the challenges to the statute.216 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed its holding in Doe v. Miller in Weems v. 
Little Rock Police Department,217 which addressed the constitutionality of 
 
 
 210. 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Doe II]. 
 211. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844 (S.D. Iowa 2004) [hereinafter Doe I]. 
 212. Doe II, 405 F.3d at 723. 
 213. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(2) (West 2003). 
 214. Id. § 692A.2A(1). 
 215. Doe II, 405 F.3d at 708–22. 
 216. Id. 
 217. 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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Arkansas’ sex offender restrictions statute.218 Judge Colloton authored 
both the opinion in Weems and the majority opinion in Doe v. Miller. As 
noted above, the Arkansas statute is very different than the Iowa law. Most 
significantly, in Arkansas, an individual determination of dangerousness is 
necessary before the restrictions are enforced.219 
Because the court in Weems simply applied the decision in Doe v. 
Miller to a more narrowly tailored statute, the court did not need to revisit 
its analysis. Consequently, the panel did not substantially expand upon its 
discussion in Doe v. Miller. As of this date, Doe v. Miller and Weems v. 
Little Rock Police Department remain the leading precedents on sex 
offender exclusion zones. The findings in those opinions are representative 
of the various other state appellate court220 and federal district court 
opinions221 concerning exclusion zones. 
C. Private Actors 
Supplementing state and local exclusion zones, an increasing number 
of private communities are adopting their own rules excluding sex 
offenders from their borders. In Florida, the state database of registered 
sex offenders has provided communities with an easy mechanism to 
exclude sex offenders.222 In some gated communities, even temporary 
stays by convicted sex offenders are prohibited.223  
The actions of private actors are troublesome because they are likely to 
completely evade judicial and legislative review. In America, community 
associations are afforded virtual carte blanche in restricting who lives 
within that community unless the exclusion is of a protected class.224 The 
 
 
 218. Id. at 1015. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Boyd v. State, No. CR-04-0936, 2006 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 18 (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 
2006); Boyd v. State, 2006 Ala. LEXIS 380, No. 1041122, (Ala. Dec. 29, 2006); Lee v. State, 895 So. 
2d 1038 (Ala. 2004); Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 2004); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 
(Iowa 2005); ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-078, 139 N.M. 761, 137 P.3d 
1215; Nasal v. Dover, 169 Ohio App. 3d 262, 2006-Ohio-5584, 862 N.E.2d 571; Hyle v. Porter, No. 
CO50768, 2006 Ohio App. Lexis 5456, 2006-Ohio-5454 (Oct. 20, 2006). 
 221. Doe v. Petro, No. 1:05CV125, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35537 (S.D. Ohio May 4, 2005); Doe 
v. Petro, No. 1:05CV125, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80753 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 24, 2006); Coston v. Petro, 
398 F. Supp. 2d 878 (S.D. Ohio 2005); Graham v. Henry, No. 06CV381TCK (FHM), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 65880 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2006); Doe v. Parish, No. 06CV0457CVE (FHM), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 65873 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2006); Doe v. Baker, No. 1:05CV2265 (TWT), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 67925 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2006). 
 222. S.I. Rosenbaum, Sex Offenders not Wanted in River Hills, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), 
May 19, 2006, at 22. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 
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only opinion considering the legality of private covenants against sex 
offenders, Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners Ass’n,225 held that 
a community was allowed to bar a sale to a sex offender because of a 
restrictive covenant.226 The trend toward private restrictions on sex 
offenders is hardly surprising because, as Lior Strahilevitz has noted, “the 
presence of convicted offenders seems to raise serious alarm among 
neighbors, such that targeting sex offenders for exclusion may be a 
rational response for some homeowners associations.”227 There is also a 
strong economic incentive for communities to bar sex offenders, as a 
single offender moving to a community can have a substantial negative 
effect on property values.228 
While the effects of private community restrictions may seem 
miniscule when compared to the larger, broader restrictions of states and 
localities, the importance of these restrictions may become more 
pronounced in the future. As new housing developments become old 
developments, the covenants and restrictions on the property remain. 
There is also a heightened risk of these private restrictions becoming 
common in cities where only a few neighborhoods are outside of 
government exclusion zones. In those cases, the Not-In-My-Backyard 
(“NIMBY”) effect will serve as a driving force to prevent a neighborhood 
from becoming a haven to sex offenders.229 While the development of 
private exclusion zones is in its very early stages, it is a trend that bears 
watching because it could further accentuate the effects of state and local 
exclusion zones. 
 
 
104 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (2006); John J. Herman, Not in My Community: Is it Legal for Private 
Entities to Ban Sex Offenders from Living in Their Communities?, 16 WIDENER L.J. 165 (2006). 
 225. Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass’n, 766 A.2d 1186 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
 226. Id. at 1192. 
 227. Strahilevitz, supra note 224, at 1845. 
 228. Caleb Durling, Comment, Never Going Home: Does it Make Us Safer? Does it Make Sense? 
Sex Offenders, Residency Restrictions, and Reforming Risk Management Law, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 317, 333–34 (2006). 
 229. Logan, supra note 19, at 10. 
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III. BANISHMENT AND SEX OFFENDERS 
Lots of times you can feel as an exile in a country that you were 
born in. 
—Azar Nafisi230 
I began this Article by reviewing a long history of banishment in 
Western societies. Then, I turned to the evolution of sex offender 
punishment in America during the last decade. I believe there are 
important connections between the historical practices of banishment and 
the use of residency restrictions on sex offenders. These connections help 
to illustrate the legal, policy, and ethical problems with sex offender 
exclusion zones.  
A. Are Residency Restrictions Banishment?—Court Opinions 
Courts that have reviewed sex offender residency restriction policies 
have attempted to distinguish exclusion zones from banishment. The 
challenges to exclusion zone laws thus far have focused on single state 
laws. The issue of whether restrictions are analogous to banishment arises 
primarily in the discussion of retroactive application of residency 
restrictions. 
Because residency restrictions are relatively new and are typically 
applied to sex offenders who committed crimes before the passage of the 
law, persons challenging the statutes argue that the restrictions constitute 
ex post facto punishments. The Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 
10 of the Constitution prohibits legislatures from enacting laws that apply 
punishment retroactively for criminal acts that have already been 
committed.231 In analyzing a statute to determine whether it violates the 
Ex Post Facto Clause, a court must first determine whether the legislation 
at issue was intended to be civil or criminal in nature.232 If the law was 
intended to be criminal, then the law is necessarily punitive and subject to 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.233 However, if the legislature intended the 
statute to be civil, then a court must determine if the statute is so punitive 
in purpose or effect as to negate the intent of the legislature.234 The 
 
 
 230. Interview with Azar Nafisi, Identity Theory, Feb. 5, 2004, http://www.identitytheory.com/ 
interviews/birnbaum139.php.  
 231. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). 
 232. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).  
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
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Supreme Court, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,235 identified several 
factors to determine whether a particular law is punitive in purpose or 
effect.236 One of those factors is whether the statute is historically or 
traditionally similar to punishment.237 It is at this stage of analysis that 
courts evaluating the constitutionality of work and residency restrictions 
on sex offenders determine whether the restrictions are analogous to 
banishment.  
Despite the dearth of housing available to sex offenders under the Iowa 
law, the Eighth Circuit in Doe v. Miller found that Iowa’s sex offender 
restrictions did not constitute banishment.238 As is typical, the Eighth 
Circuit approached the analogy to banishment in the context of its ex post 
facto analysis. Notably, the panel split on this issue and Judge Melloy 
wrote a dissent arguing that the Iowa residency restrictions forced sex 
offenders into exile.239 In disagreeing with Judge Melloy, the majority 
identified three reasons for finding the analogy to banishment 
unpersuasive.240  
First, the majority found that although the Iowa law restricted where a 
sex offender could live, it did not actually expel the offender from the 
community.241 Under the Iowa law, a sex offender could freely enter the 
2,000 foot radius around a school, but could not live within that 
perimeter.242 This distinction was significant for the Eighth Circuit in 
distinguishing the Iowa law from historical practices of banishment.243  
Second, the court found that because the statute had a grandfather 
clause which allowed offenders who established residence within a 
restricted zone before July 1, 2002 to remain at that residence, the law was 
not intended to banish sex offenders.244 This reasoning is dubious given 
that the law was being challenged in a class action and the court did not 
distinguish between those plaintiffs who had an established residence and 
those that did not. In a facial challenge to a law by a class, it was probably 
 
 
 235. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
 236. The five factors are whether the law: has been historically considered to be punishment, 
promotes the traditional goals of punishment, imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, has a 
rational connection to some nonpunitive purpose, and is excessive with respect to the purpose. Id. at 
168–69. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Doe II, 405 F.3d 700, 719–20. 
 239. Id. at 723 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
 240. Id. at 719–20. 
 241. Id. at 719. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
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a mistake for the Eighth Circuit to rely on a narrowly crafted exception to 
the general law to evaluate its overall intent. 
Third, the court found that because sex offender statutes are of 
relatively recent origin and unique in nature, they are distinct from the 
historical punishment of banishment.245 This line of argument is also 
suspect since any recently crafted law would escape analogy to past 
punishment by virtue of its newness. As noted earlier, banishment has 
never been a common punishment in the United States. Further, the 
historical forms of banishment, expulsion and prison colonies, are not 
possible in the modern era. As a result, newness should not be a definitive 
factor lest any innovative punishment scheme survive review. 
Because of the vacuous nature of the majority’s second and third 
reasons for distinguishing banishment from the Iowa statute, a fair reading 
of the opinion would place great weight on the first reason offered by the 
panel: that the law did not actually prohibit sex offenders from traveling 
into the restricted zones. This was the primary distinction upon which the 
dissent focused. 
Judge Melloy’s dissent highlighted the district court’s factual finding 
that the Iowa law effectively barred sex offenders from living in large, 
contiguous areas throughout the state.246 The district court found that: 
[S]ex offenders are completely banned from living in a number of 
Iowa’s small towns and cities. In the state’s major communities, 
offenders are relegated to living in industrial areas, in some of the 
cities’ most expensive developments, or on the very outskirts of 
town where available housing is limited . . . . In larger cities such as 
Des Moines and Iowa City, the maps show that the two thousand 
foot circles cover virtually the entire city area. The few areas in Des 
Moines, for instance, which are not restricted, include only 
industrial areas or some of the city’s newest and most expensive 
neighborhoods.247 
Based upon this factual finding, the dissent argued that sex offenders were 
effectively banished, in fact, from numerous Iowa communities even 
though legal “safe” zones existed throughout the state. A crucial difference 
between the dissent and the majority decision is that the dissent recognized 
that a sex offender could not enter a “safe” zone and expect to find suitable 
housing.  
 
 
 245. Id. at 720. 
 246. Id. at 724 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
 247. Id. (quoting Doe I, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 869, 851). 
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The discussion in Doe v. Miller also illustrates that different judges 
have different definitions of “banishment.” And those definitions are 
neither explicitly stated nor discussed in the opinions. Consequently, I 
hope to rectify the failure of courts to define the parameters of banishment 
in the next section. 
B. What is Banishment? 
While most courts have presumed an unspoken definition of 
“banishment,” a few have actually offered some meaning for the word. As 
discussed earlier, in United States v. Ju Toy,248 Justice Brewer offered an 
extensive investigation of banishment in his dissenting opinion. In his 
dissent, Justice Brewer borrowed from Black’s Law Dictionary, defining 
banishment as “punishment inflicted upon criminals by compelling them 
to quit a city, place, or country, for a specific period of time, or for life.”249 
In Smith v. Doe, the Court described banishment as punishment where 
criminals could not “return to their original community.”250 In Delgadillo 
v. Carmichael,251 the Supreme Court found that deportation can be the 
“equivalent of banishment or exile.”252 Whatever the definition of “exile” 
is, the evidence is clear that at the time of the original Constitutional 
Convention banishment was considered punishment.253 However, the 
exact parameters of what is “banishment” are still undefined by the 
Supreme Court. Certainly, most scholars would agree that a simple 
restraining order is not “banishment.” Yet, the dictionary and similar 
definitions utilized by courts do not offer a clear distinction between a 
restraining order and complete banishment. 
Without a clear definition of banishment, there is no bright line for 
courts to apply in comparing the existing sex offender restrictions with 
traditional enforcement of exile punishments. An impediment to creating a 
definition of “banishment” with precision is that it is difficult to address 
the exact geographic limits and account for changes in the ease of travel. 
In ancient societies, banishing someone from a city-state only required the 
person to move a few miles away. In the modern world, there is a 
 
 
 248. 198 U.S. 253, at 269–70 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY). 
 249. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 250. Smith, 538 U.S. 84, 98. 
 251. 332 U.S. 388 (1947). 
 252. Id. at 391. 
 253. Bleichmar, supra note 52, at 117 (“[B]y focusing on the Colonial period as the point in time 
in which banishment was considered to be punishment, originalism becomes a powerful interpretative 
tool for the Constitutional argument that deportation is in fact punishment.”). 
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presumption that the area from which a person is expelled must be much 
larger. After all, the simple restraining order often keeps a criminal away 
from a victim, but is a far cry from actual exile. Thus, any definition is 
subject to the vagaries of transportation, urban sprawl, and community 
size. As a result, I do not offer a distance measure as an element of 
banishment. 
An important consideration in the above discussion is that there is no 
definitional reason that exile requires a person to leave a sovereign 
territory. No case law makes that part of the definition. From a historical 
perspective, the use of prison colonies in Soviet societies demonstrates 
that exile need not be to an external place.  
Based upon a review of the historical uses of banishment, I have 
identified three core elements that recur in every exile scheme. First, 
banishment is the expulsion in fact of a person from a community. This 
part of the definition emphasizes that a person must be sent away from a 
group of persons in a common community. Thus, it is distinguishable from 
the restraining order scenario. The definition also makes no distinction 
based on state or national boundaries as the practice of exile predated any 
such modern state distinctions.  
Second, banishment is always to a non-institutional setting. While a 
person might speak colloquially in saying a person was banished to a 
prison or mental institution, banishment as a policy necessitates neither 
institutional control nor support for the banished. In expulsion, prison 
colonies, and internal exile, a person had the responsibility to care for 
themselves and had substantially more freedom than an average prisoner. 
Third, banishment is intended to sever ties to a community. This is the 
only part of the definition that looks to the goals and purposes of the state 
in using exile as a criminal sentence. Expulsion, prison colonies, and 
internal exile systems have all been characterized by the intent to sever 
community ties. Thus, Georgia’s use of 158-county exile is banishment 
because it attempts to sever a convict’s ties with the Georgia community. 
However, a restraining order that only prevents a person from being within 
100 feet of his or her victim does not attempt to sever community ties.  
With a definition of “banishment” in place that draws from the various 
historical examples, I turn to the task of determining how sex offender 
exclusion zones fit within the historical precedents of banishment 
punishments.  
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C. Are Residency Restrictions Banishment?—Revisited 
Applying the above definition of banishment to the sex offender 
residency restriction context yields a different conclusion than the one 
reached by the majority in Doe v. Miller. Sex offender exclusion zones fit 
all three of the elements of banishment as described above. 
First, residency restrictions lead to the expulsion in fact of a person 
from many communities. The factual analysis by the district court 
reviewing the effects of the Iowa statute makes clear that even in a largely 
rural state like Iowa, sex offenders were offered very few places to live.254 
In smaller towns, the presence of a single school would bar a sex offender 
from living or working anywhere within the incorporated areas of the 
town.255 Some medium-sized towns and cities only have a few pockets of 
areas where sex offenders could live.256 However, those “safe” areas were 
often industrial sectors or contained little housing in which an average sex 
offender could find residency.257 Throughout the state, most of the areas 
where the statute permitted sex offenders to live were located in rural 
areas.258 The district court noted that these rural areas had housing that 
was “not necessarily readily available.”259 If these were the effects of 
exclusion zones in Iowa, a largely rural state, one can only imagine the 
results in California once its residency restriction law goes into effect.  
In Georgia, the state maintains a 1,000 foot radius for exclusion zones, 
half as far of a radius as Iowa and California. This is the map of DeKalb 
County that plaintiffs challenging the exclusion zones created to illustrate 
the effects of Georgia’s residency restrictions:260 
 
 
 254. Doe I, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 851. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. This map was produced by the Southern Center for Human Rights pursuant to its litigation in 
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The shaded areas in the map are places where sex offenders cannot live. 
The dots represent the sex offenders who were part of the class action suit 
challenging the residency restrictions. As the map illustrates, the residency 
options for sex offenders in the county are essentially nonexistent. 
Second, residency restrictions do not put an offender in an institutional 
setting with institutional support. Residency restrictions are different than 
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the use of prisons and mental health facilities for sex offenders as there is 
clearly no institutional control or support present. 
Third, with exclusion zones, there is a well-documented intent by 
lawmakers who pushed for and passed residency restriction laws to sever 
community connections with sex offenders. The state politicians proposing 
and supporting residency restrictions have made their intent to exile sex 
offenders quite clear.261 In Georgia, legislators said their goal was to 
“drive sex offenders out of the state.”262 The Attorney General in Nebraska 
told reporters in support of residency restrictions that his goal was to 
“[keep] these criminals out of our communities.”263 An Iowa mayor 
supporting exclusion zones stated that he “just didn’t want those kind of 
people moving into town.”264 In Florida, state representative Susan 
Goldstein said that the state’s residency restriction law was designed “to 
get these people out of our neighborhoods and hopefully our state.”265 
Examples of the intent to have sex offenders leave communities are 
present in nearly every discussion to adopt local or state residency 
restriction laws. 
Based upon prior precedent of banishment, exclusion zones fit clearly 
within that historical paradigm. Residency restrictions meet all three 
essential elements to amount to exile punishment. Even beyond the 
definitional argument, the similarities to the propiska internal exile system 
in the Soviet Union are also strong.  
Exclusion zones for sex offenders in the United States resemble the 
Soviet Union’s practices enabled by propiska in several important ways. 
First, neither system actually banished an offender from the sovereign 
territory. Rather, the statutes focused on limiting the residency options of 
criminals. Both systems resulted in a situation where a person was 
banished from mainstream society, but not allowed to leave the larger 
sovereign body. Second, the laws targeted some of the most 
unsympathetic members of their respective societies. In the Soviet Union, 
prostitutes and repeat criminals were the primary targets for 
 
 
 261. Logan, supra note 19, at 19–20. 
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banishment.266 In the United States, sex offenders have made easy targets 
for politicians.267 Third, the laws have been enforced entirely extra-
judicially and without possibility of appeal.268 Many of the statutes in the 
United States have also applied retroactively and required no finding of 
individual future dangerousness.  
For the most part, other Western societies have not followed the Soviet 
example. In fact, the forcible relocation and banishment by Soviet leaders 
was frequently condemned by Western countries.269 With the development 
of sex offender exclusion zones, however, it appears the United States is 
taking the first steps in potentially following the lead of the Soviet Union 
in the utilization of internal exile punishments. 
Given that the system enabled by propiska is one of the very few 
examples of modern systems of internal exile, we would ignore these 
commonalities at our peril. The connections between exclusion laws and 
propiska can help to illustrate the pitfalls of an exclusion-zone-centered 
approach to sex offender policy. Identifying those connections helps to 
demonstrate how America may be moving to a system of internal exile as 
a key component of its criminal justice system. 
With sex offenders, America is undergoing an experiment with internal 
exile. These internal exile systems represent an important step in the 
evolution of banishment systems in Western history.270 Without frontiers, 
expulsion and prison colonies are not possible. Banishment has been 
historically motivated by the dissatisfaction with prisons as a means of 
punishment. While the roots of that motivation in Anglo-Saxon tradition 
were cyclical public backlashes against the barbarism of prisons, the 
current ire at prisons is due in most part to simple economics. Exclusion 
zones are the natural culmination of a society which does not want to rely 
wholly on prisons, but still wants to remove its offenders from its midst. 
 
 
 266. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 268. Logan, supra note 19, at 16. 
 269. See, e.g., David Bird, Global Rights Group Calls For More Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
1986, at A16. 
 270. The blog TalkLeft had a post, “Exiles from Main Street,” which was very similar to the 
original title of this Article: “Exiles on Main Street.” See Posting of TChris to TalkLeft: The Politics of 
Crime, Exiles from Main Street, http://www.talkleft.com/story/2005/10/03/627/48298 (Oct. 3, 2005, 
09:26:06 AM EST). I mention this similarity because it illustrates the fine line between internal exile 
and de facto complete exile. Internal exile allows a person to continue to traverse large sections of a 
sovereign area. However, at some point, if there are no available places to sleep at night, then the right 
to traverse is fundamentally lost. A person thus becomes, banished from “Main Street.” As it stands 
today, most states have only exiled sex offenders on “Main Street” because they still travel freely to 
many of the locations where they cannot live. However, as more states and localities adopt restrictions, 
TalkLeft’s title will become the accurate description. 
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Certainly, residency restrictions are different than expulsion and prison 
colonies. However, the resemblances to internal exile are striking. Further, 
exclusion zones meet every aspect of our definition of banishment which 
is derived from the historical use of banishment as punishment. If we then 
proceed under the assumption that exclusion zones are in fact internal 
banishment policies, what does that tell us about their legal, policy, and 
ethical status? 
IV. THE FAILINGS OF INTERNAL EXILE 
People who feel themselves to be exiles in this world are mightily 
inclined to believe themselves citizens of another. 
—Santayana271 
Internal exile through the use of sex offender exclusion zones is a 
significant development in criminal law in the United States. The move to 
any form of banishment on a mass scale is relatively unprecedented in 
America. The choice of internal exile is even more unusual in a historical 
context as only the Soviet Union and Russia have adopted similar policies 
before. Because of the uniqueness of these policies, policymakers and 
courts should tread carefully in this emerging area of lawmaking. 
In this section, I address the various issues raised by the use of 
exclusion zones for sex offenders. These issues include legal questions, 
policy concerns, and problems associated with the cultural context in 
which these laws are being adopted. I also answer the policy arguments in 
favor of residency restriction laws. 
A. Problems with Internal Exile of Sex Offenders 
I have divided the core problems with an internal exile system for sex 
offenders into two major categories. First, exclusion zones reinforce the 
otherness of offenders by rendering them exiles. This effect undermines 
the stated goals of residency restrictions while jeopardizing fundamental 
American values. Second, exclusion zones use a form of class-based 
banishment that is antithetical to American democracy. I discuss each of 
these major problem areas below in detail.  
The creation of communities at the 101st kilometer in the Soviet Union 
was a notable event, in part because of the effects felt by the population 
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living within those communities. A significant part of being exiled is 
assuming the identity of an exile. An “exile” is someone cast out by 
society, separated from friends, family, and familiar places. A community 
of “exiles” is a transient community in the extreme sense. The population 
is brought together by external forces against the wishes of those located 
there. There is no wealth in such a community. The prospects of finding 
gainful employment for a large segment of the population are poor. A 
town of the banished has no history and an uncertain future. It is a place 
and a people living only in the present. As the quote from Santayana that 
begins this section makes clear, when a population is forced out of the 
world they know, they come to believe themselves citizens of another 
world entirely. 
Valentina Ievleva-Pavlenko is one of the many who were banished to 
the 101st kilometer.272 Ievleva-Pavlenko settled in Alexandrov, 101 
kilometers from Moscow and the “unofficial capital of the 101st 
kilometer.”273 She recalled that “[b]efore [she] came [to Alexandrov], 
[she] went from place to place . . . . The problem was where [she] could 
get a job, they would not let [her] live. Where [she] was allowed to live, 
there were no jobs.”274 So, Ievleva-Paylenko, and others like her, 
continued to live within the Soviet Union because they could not leave. 
They became part of one of many communities that existed because the 
government had no other place to send the people living there.275  
So far, exclusion zones in America have only created small pockets of 
sex offender communities, often located in motels or small apartment 
complexes.276 However, the small degree to which offender communities 
have formed is due in large part to the recency of the enforcement of these 
laws. Further, most of the early enforcers of exclusion zones (Iowa, 
Georgia, and Alabama) are rural states. As a result, large portions of the 
states were still open to sex offenders. As more urbanized states like 
California begin to enforce their restrictions and other states increase their 
exclusion zone radii to 2,500 feet or greater, the areas where sex offenders 
can live will certainly decrease. As private communities seek to drive out 
sex offenders, a market will certainly develop, and as the experience in the 
Soviet Union demonstrated, exile communities will develop. When these 
 
 
 272. FitzGerald, supra note 4.  
 273. Id. 
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communities develop and grow, a variety of problems will develop as 
well. 
One of the primary hopes of the American criminal justice system is 
that after someone has served his time in prison, he will be able to become 
a productive member of society. However, as the experience of those 
internally exiled in Russia illustrates, reentry and reassimilation is 
extremely difficult for the banished. Given the general hostility toward sex 
offenders in the United States, as opposed to those who were banished in 
the Soviet Union, it is likely that internal exile for sex offenders will only 
exacerbate the difficulties of reentry. And, as research has indicated, a 
failure to facilitate successful reentry will likely increase the risk of sex 
offender recidivism.277 Further, undermining housing, employment, and 
access to public transportation also increases the risk of recidivism.278 
Without an ability to be part of mainstream American society, sex 
offenders will be left with little choice but to return to their lives as 
criminals. 
Unlike the towns of the 101st kilometer, the emerging ghettos brought 
about by the war on sex crimes have populations with one powerful 
connection among them: they are all convicted sex offenders. Thus, a sex 
offender community in search of its identity need not look far to find 
something to unite them. Pedophiles will find many others just like them. 
Rapists will surely have rapists as their neighbors. There is a large 
literature about the schools-of-crime pattern in prisons.279 The growth of 
the Internet has also shown the problem of networking among sex 
offenders.280 Creating sex offender communities will likely cause a repeat 
of these problems in a public environment. Sex offenders can learn from 
each other in the same way prisoners do. Further, especially in the context 
of child pornography, ready-made networks will be formed—the same 
type of networks that police in America are constantly trying to fight.281 
The demographics of these ghettos will surely be unusual. An 
overwhelming majority of convicted sex offenders are men.282 While some 
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of these men will marry or remarry upon release from prisons, the gender 
breakdown of the population will likely skew toward a large population of 
men. With so few couples, one would also expect few children in such a 
town. This, of course, fits well with the goals of restricting the residency 
of sex offenders. With mostly men and few children around, there will be 
fewer opportunities for the typical patterns of sexual violence (male to 
female, male to child of either sex). 
However, even if there will be fewer potential victims in sex offender 
communities, it does not follow that there will be fewer incidents of sexual 
violence. A notable aspect of child molesters is that they often abuse the 
same victims over a long time frame.283 Similarly, child pornography often 
uses the same “models” over and over.284 Creating a community with a lot 
of persons prone to repeat past sex crimes will facilitate an environment in 
which sexual violence is more acceptable. There are fewer normalizing, 
socializing, and other pressures against sexual violence in a community in 
which virtually everyone is there precisely because they have committed 
some form of sexual violence in their life. By adopting exclusion zones, 
lawmakers are risking the creation of environments in which sexual 
violence is the norm, not the exception. This will not likely facilitate the 
treatment and rehabilitation of offenders.  
However, many sex offenders may choose not to join emerging sex 
offender ghettos. Because of the various negative effects on the lives of 
sex offenders, the incentive to disappear under a residency restriction 
program is heightened. Under a normal probation scheme, there is a 
certain percentage of sex offenders who fail to report or otherwise 
disappear.285 This has developed into an accepted inevitability in the 
American criminal justice system. 
With the advent of exclusion zones, there are good reasons to expect 
this disappearing act to occur more frequently with sex offenders.286 The 
life of a restricted sex offender who chooses to live in a community with 
exclusion zones is one of constant accountability and responsibility. 
Offenders must know where all of the protected areas are within their 
larger community. Before choosing any place to live, the offender must 
determine where each exclusion zone begins and ends. This could include 
consulting state, local, and private restrictions. If the offender’s family 
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lives within an exclusion zone, then the offender must either live 
separately or the whole family must relocate. Because many sex offenders 
are transients,287 this difficulty can manifest itself on a repeating basis. 
Once an offender settles on a domicile, the process may have to be 
repeated if the state or locality also has work restrictions. Given the 
incredible difficulty sex offenders have in finding any job, the exclusion 
zones can be a sentence to perpetual unemployment. With some localities 
adding loitering or travel restrictions, a sex offender must be aware of the 
boundaries of every exclusion zone that he or she may breach in daily 
travel. 
The trend of offenders going underground was exactly what happened 
under internal exile systems in the Soviet Union and Russia. A newspaper 
investigation of those living at the 101st kilometer under Soviet rule 
described the experience of the exiles as such: 
When you study the files of investigations, you are astonished at the 
sameness of the case histories. . . . After the first conviction, the 
person is sent to live beyond the “101st kilometer.” He makes futile 
attempts to find a job, travels to Moscow and lives there without 
being registered. He spends his nights in sheds, empty houses, 
dumps, and garrets. Then come numerous warnings from the police, 
and finally, criminal charges are brought for persistent violation of 
[internal] passport regulations or vagrancy.288 
The risk of going underground can vary from state to state with the level 
of enforcement for compliance and the penalties associated with 
noncompliance. 
While no state has developed sufficient data to really examine the 
threat of sex offenders going underground in response to residency 
restrictions, the experience in Iowa is telling. Already, local police and 
probation officers are reporting a one hundred percent increase in sex 
offenders failing to report since the residency restrictions went into 
effect.289 As a result, a group of prosecutors and police in Iowa have 
formed to try to get the state to repeal its exclusion zone legislation.290  
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Ultimately, if more offenders go underground, then the net result of sex 
offender residency restrictions will be negative. When an offender is off 
the radar, then the existing compliance, treatment, and monitoring options 
will have no effect. An offender is also unlikely to find any stability or 
employment when living underground. Such a scenario is a recipe for 
recidivism. An offender will be without any social contacts or employment 
and probably living in transitional housing. Such an outcome will render 
residency restrictions useless for that offender and the risk of recidivism 
will only increase. 
In order to address the concern that sex offenders would be more 
inclined to go underground with an exclusion zone system, California 
became the first state to adopt universal GPS monitoring to enforce the 
state’s restrictions.291 At first blush, GPS monitoring does serve to address 
a primary weakness in the exclusion zone systems. However, that 
monitoring comes at a very high economic cost.292 To ensure lifetime 
enforcement in relative real-time for sex offenders, the cost would be 
exorbitant.293 For the time being, the state is offering far less to prevent 
GPS monitoring from becoming as expensive as imprisonment. The 
statute requires sex offenders to pay for the cost of their monitoring if they 
can afford it.294 However, early reports show that the population of 
offenders that could actually pay for their monitoring may be very 
small.295 
It is also unclear what benefits GPS monitoring offers if a sex offender 
makes a conscious decision to go underground. The attached anklet is 
readily removable and an offender could easily discard it before 
disappearing.296 As a result, it is unlikely that GPS monitoring offers more 
than a band-aid to the serious problem of sex offenders deciding to go 
underground to avoid the hassles of complying with exclusion zones. 
Another one of the unfortunate side effects of exclusion zones is that 
sex offenders are often forced to move far away from treatment 
facilities.297 Because exclusion zones are typically centered around schools 
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and child care facilities, they are predominately found in urban areas. In 
those states with large exclusion zone radii there is a definite effect of 
driving sex offenders into rural areas. Unfortunately, almost all major sex 
offender treatment facilities are located in urban areas.298 As a 
consequence, by pushing offenders far away from treatment facilities, the 
result is that fewer sex offenders are able to get treatment.299  
This effect can be even more pronounced in cities and states that 
supplement exclusion zones with anti-loitering provisions. No state has 
carved out exceptions to their loitering provisions for offenders to receive 
treatment. Without those exceptions, a sex offender can be legally barred 
from going to a treatment facility because it is proximate to a school, child 
care facility, or other protected area. With some states adding bus stops to 
the list of protected areas, it is unlikely that many sex offenders will be 
able to travel the large distances to treatment facilities even if they are so 
inclined. 
Tennessee adopted a very unusual law that actually prohibits sex 
offenders from going to a treatment facility “within one thousand 
feet . . . of the property line of any public school, private or parochial 
school, licensed day care center, other child care facility, public park, 
playground, recreation center or public athletic field available for use by 
the general public.”300 The net result is that sex offenders cannot get 
treatment to help fight the urge to re-offend. This policy choice by 
Tennessee is currently exceptional, but if other states or localities follow 
its lead, then treatment may be unattainable to many sex offenders seeking 
professional help. 
While treatment is not a panacea for sex offender recidivism, the 
limited evidence that exists shows that treatment is an important part of 
decreasing future criminality.301 While the studies do suffer from various 
methodological limitations,302 the empirical evidence from states with 
developed treatment programs show a statistically significant difference in 
 
 
POST, Apr. 17, 2007, at B03, available at 2007 WLNR 7283895; Deena Winter, City to Look at 
Offender Restrictions, LINCOLN J. STAR (Neb.), May 16, 2006, at B1, available at 2006 WL 8628803. 
 298. Jim Collar & Wendy Harris, Advocates: Sex Abuse Misconceptions Abound, POST-CRESCENT 
(Appleton, Wis.), July 29, 2007, at 12A. 
 299. Ingold, supra note 297; Winter, supra note 297. 
 300. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (2006). 
 301. JOHN Q. LA FOND, PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: HOW SOCIETY SHOULD COPE WITH SEX 
OFFENDERS 8 (2005). 
 302. Id. at 20. 
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the level of sex offender recidivism.303 Treatment has also shown greater 
effectiveness in decreasing recidivism of certain classes of offenders.304 
Insofar as sex offenders are released from prison, there is a societal 
responsibility to do everything possible to ensure offenders do not find 
more victims. After all, this is the rationale for the exclusion zone laws. 
However, by diminishing access to treatment by displacing offenders from 
treatment facilities, exclusion laws directly reduce the effectiveness of one 
of the few policies that has actually shown promise in decreasing offender 
recidivism. 
By removing sex offenders from friends, family, and treatment, we are 
surely setting them up for failure. Exclusion zones reinforce the cycle of 
crime and essentially wash our hands clean of addressing the problems of 
sexual violence. A simple abdication of responsibility through exclusion 
zones is an untenable policy over the long term. It also represents a 
complete dissociation between the American public and the lives of sex 
offenders.  
B. Class-Based Banishment in American Democracy 
Beyond the consequentialist objections to forming sex offender 
societies and pushing offenders underground, there is a significant 
problem with expelling a class of persons from American society. With 
the exception of the Arkansas statute, sex offender exclusion zones do not 
require any additional hearing or finding of dangerousness.305 The laws 
simply treat all sex offenders under the statutes as part of a class to be 
exiled.  
This type of action is virtually unprecedented in the United States. 
When a convict is sent to prison, due process is afforded, a trial occurs, 
and appeals are made. However, when a sex offender is internally exiled, 
it is performed extra-judicially with no warning and no recourse for the 
offender. Wayne Logan argues that this move upsets America’s basic 
collectivist endeavor.306 I think the problem is even larger than that. 
Designating a class in America as undesirable or wholly unwanted is 
against the basic principles of American pluralism. The analogy to Soviet 
internal exile practices is not just an illustration; it is a warning. 
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 304. LA FOND, supra note 301, at 20. 
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 306. See generally Logan, supra note 19. 
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America has physically excluded populations based upon membership 
in a class in very rare cases, and those situations are hardly the brightest 
spots in American history. Historically, major exclusions included racial 
segregation of African Americans and interning of Japanese Americans. 
There were also less well-known attempts to physically exclude, like the 
Chinese laborer situation described in Justice Brewer’s dissent in Ju Toy307 
and the crackdown on homeless persons in the middle of the twentieth 
century. 
Sex offenders are easily distinguishable from all of those excluded 
populations because they have committed heinous acts. For that reason, 
one might argue that this sort of class-based banishment does not represent 
a substantial harm to the American system of democracy and justice. 
However, the law as it is currently evolving does not premise exclusion on 
the horrible acts of sex offenders. In fact, a great many people subject to 
the residency restrictions have done very little. One of the plaintiffs in 
Georgia was a mother who bought contraceptives for her underage child 
who was having sex.308 That the Georgia Supreme Court saw no problem 
with the legislature’s decision to enforce residency restrictions against her 
(with the penalty of up to thirty years in prison for violation of those 
restrictions) shows that exclusion zones represent a danger to people well 
beyond the serial child molester. 
While sex offenders are easy targets because of their political 
vulnerability, there is no legal reason to distinguish the internal exile of 
sex offenders from other potentially undesirable populations. Once we 
accept the premise that internal exile of a class of persons without a 
hearing is merely a regulatory action, a powerful tool is placed in the 
hands of governmental authority.309 That tool may never be wielded 
against groups other than sex offenders, but its mere presence is an affront 
to basic precepts of American pluralism. 
C. Aggravating Factors 
The negative effects of residency restrictions are reinforced by three 
aggravating trends. First, in order to avoid becoming havens for sex 
offenders, communities are in a race to the bottom in terms of regulating 
sex offenders. Second, the failure by states and localities to notify sex 
offenders of the boundaries of exclusion zones actually creates an 
 
 
 307. See supra notes 110–19 and accompanying text. 
 308. Complaint at 4, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 309. JANUS, supra note 18, at 5. 
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“uncertainty effect” which makes protected areas much larger than their 
statutorily defined limits. Third, the aggregation of sex offender 
restrictions greatly heightens the negative effects of exclusion zones. 
These three aggravating factors make the harms created by residency 
restrictions much worse and will increase those effects over time. 
1. Racing to the Bottom 
The race-to-the-bottom pattern is already occurring in several states. In 
Lincoln, Nebraska, the mayor identified a “domino effect” throughout the 
state of towns implementing sex offender exclusion zones so that the state 
would not become a refuge for Iowa’s sex offenders.310 The rapid pace at 
which Florida cities have adopted exclusion zones is attributable to each 
community fearing that it would become a safe haven for sex offenders 
after a neighboring town implemented residency restrictions.311 Wyoming 
has begun debating residency restrictions in response to a report that the 
state’s wide open spaces and libertarian tendencies make it a popular 
destination for fleeing sex offenders.312 
Quick and effective reaction by a community neighboring another with 
an established exclusion policy is also necessary to avoid “inter-
community strife.”313 Communities are faced with the choice of either 
risking becoming dumping grounds for other communities’ sex offenders 
or implementing their own exclusion zones. There is not a middle-ground 
option available once the dominos start falling for localities without 
residency restrictions. The race to the bottom is also facilitated by the clear 
holding in Doe v. Miller which provides judicial cover to any community 
seeking to adopt its own exclusion zone law.314 
The race to the bottom is also self-reinforcing. As the number of 
communities in a given area without exclusion zones decreases, the 
incentive to adopt residency restrictions increases in order to avoid 
becoming one of the few safe havens for offenders to live. There has also 
 
 
 310. Winter, supra note 297, at B1. 
 311. Leskanic, supra note 205, at 1 (noting that “[t]he contiguous cities of Miami Beach, North 
Bay Village and Miami Gardens passed restrictions within two weeks of one another. Within four 
months, at least 17 other municipalities in Miami-Dade and Broward counties adopted restrictions.”). 
 312. Associated Press, Wyoming’s Sex Offender Rules May Attract Convicts from Other States, 
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 2007, at A6, available at 2007 WLNR 3460561. 
 313. Snider, supra note 37, at 457. 
 314. Logan, supra note 19, at 20–21. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/3
p 101 Yung book pages .doc11/6/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] BANISHMENT BY A THOUSAND LAWS 149 
 
 
 
 
been a steady increase in the radii of exclusion zones used by states, a 
trend that is likely to continue in the future.315 
The race to the bottom is not, in itself, inherently destructive. After all, 
if every community adopted sex offender exclusion zones, this at least 
might yield some uniformity among differing sovereign areas. However, 
the domino effect serves to exacerbate other problems, described herein, 
associated with residency restrictions. Given the sheer volume of states 
and localities that have implemented exclusion zones in the few years 
since the first such measure went into effect, it is likely that many more 
communities will adopt similar restrictions in the near future. This 
accelerating trend further isolates sex offenders from their communities 
and society in general.  
The race to the bottom is a particularly important trend in the potential 
creation of sex offender enclaves and ghettos. If no new sex offender 
restrictions are adopted, there would probably be just a few sex offender 
communities forming. However, if the domino effect continues on its 
present course, then the amount of real estate available to sex offenders 
will continue to decrease and more sex offender communities will emerge. 
2. Uncertainty Effect  
Typically, the statutes create a buffer zone some distance from a school 
or other protected area “as the crow flies.” Such a distance is not easily 
measured by an average sex offender. The distances are even less clear 
when the protected area is something other than a school. Childcare 
facilities may include peoples’ homes. Playgrounds may include a local 
neighborhood swing set. 
The problem is compounded by the interaction of the various statutes 
and rules. In Florida, for example, there are state-defined exclusion zones. 
Those state exclusion zones are supplemented by the restrictions of over 
200 cities. Some of the restrictions apply strictly for residency; others 
apply to work location as well. Some communities also have loitering 
and/or travel exclusion zones. The protected areas also vary depending 
upon the city. Some towns include playgrounds and beaches in addition to 
child care facilities and schools. In all, a sex offender in Florida is 
accountable for an incredible array of information in order to decide where 
to live, work, and travel. The “patchwork” system in Florida has grown so 
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complex that police have been unable to figure out when offenders are in 
violation of the residency restrictions.316 
Unfortunately for offenders, states and localities have provided little 
guidance to offenders about where they can and cannot live. Further, the 
landscape for acceptable residencies changes on a regular basis as more 
localities adopt residency restrictions on offenders. Without that 
information, sex offenders have a high degree of uncertainty about how to 
comply with relevant statutes. 
As a result of this uncertainty, sex offenders have every incentive to 
avoid being close to an exclusion zone because mistake is not a defense to 
a violation of residency restrictions. The result, then, is likely to be de 
facto exclusion zones much broader than the actual legal limits. This 
“uncertainty effect” will only exacerbate the tendency to banish sex 
offenders from communities in states with residency restrictions. Even in 
situations where sex offenders are allowed to live in large sections of a 
town or city, the uncertainty effect is likely to deter sex offenders from 
living in the “safe” pockets outside of exclusion zones. 
3. Aggregation 
As it stands, the majority opinion in Doe v. Miller is persuasive 
authority for other courts deciding whether exclusion zones banish sex 
offenders. However, courts have not yet been forced to evaluate the 
aggregate effects of multiple, overlapping exclusion zone policies. As 
localities continue to adopt their own exclusion zone laws at an alarming 
rate, less and less real estate will be available to sex offenders. The result 
will be banishment, not in one fell swoop, but in the gradual elimination of 
“safe” areas for sex offenders to live. 
There are two types of aggregation relevant to residency restrictions. 
First, there is the aggregation of different protected zones. This type of 
aggregation occurs prominently under the Georgia law.317 The map of 
DeKalb County shows that the state’s decision to include bus stops in its 
list of protected areas left very few habitable areas for offenders.318 This is 
because bus stops supplement the already expansive exclusion zones 
covering schools, child care facilities, and other locations. The overlapping 
 
 
 316. Sandra Pedicini, Sex-Offender Buffer Zones Change Little; The Effect of the Ordinances Has 
Been to Encourage Offenders to Stay Put, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), May 28, 2006, at B1, available 
at 2006 WLNR 9163831. 
 317. See supra text accompanying note 260. 
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zones aggregate the off-limits areas into an incredible amount of real 
estate where sex offenders are not permitted to live. 
The second type of aggregation is of the laws of different governmental 
bodies. The discussion earlier of Florida laws illustrates this point. The 
state and hundreds of localities have adopted residency restrictions and 
anti-loitering provisions (which bar sex offenders from even entering an 
area). Any one of these rules, taken alone, has a very limited effect. Even 
if Tampa passed its complete ban on sex offenders living within the 
community, an offender might only have to move a few miles. However, 
with neighboring communities also adopting residency restrictions, the net 
effect could be that an offender has to relocate to a wholly different 
portion of the state, or leave the state entirely. This form of aggregation is 
growing more significant and is a prime reason why the early cases 
upholding sex offender residency restrictions are losing their legal 
resonance.  
D. Legal Implications of Residency Restrictions as Banishment 
If a court accepts the argument that residency restrictions are a form of 
internal exile, or, at the very least, that exclusion zones “resemble” 
banishment, then how does that change the legal outcomes in cases 
reviewing restrictions? Since Doe v. Miller is still the leading authority on 
this issue and is regularly cited and relied on by every opinion since, it 
makes sense to use that opinion as a template. 
As noted earlier, the majority opinion in Doe v. Miller analyzed the 
analogy to banishment in the context of the ex post facto claim. In its 
analysis, the court applied the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez test319 as 
applied in Smith v. Doe.320 After finding that the legislature’s intent in 
passing the restrictions bill was civil and not punitive, the court had to 
determine “whether the law is nonetheless ‘so punitive either in purpose or 
effect as to negate’ the State’s nonpunitive intent.”321  
The punitive effects test has several elements. The Eighth Circuit 
articulated the five key factors this way: “whether the law has been 
regarded in our history and traditions as punishment, whether it promotes 
the traditional aims of punishment, whether it imposes an affirmative 
disability or restraint, whether it has a rational connection to a nonpunitive 
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purpose, and whether it is excessive with respect to that purpose.”322 These 
factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive,” but they provided the 
framework for the court’s analysis.323 
The majority found that the second factor, whether the law promoted a 
traditional aim of punishment, weighed in favor of the plaintiff.324 
Similarly, the court found that the third factor, whether the law imposed an 
affirmative disability or restraint, favored the plaintiff’s claim.325 
However, the court found in favor of the government concerning the first 
factor (that the law would be considered punishment under America’s 
history and traditions), the fourth factor (that there was a rational 
connection to a non-punitive purpose), and the fifth factor (that the statute 
was excessive in relation to that purpose).326 
Even if the majority were to have accepted, as the dissent did, that 
exclusion zones were a form of banishment under America’s history and 
traditions, it is unclear if that would have changed the outcome. After all, 
the court wrote that the fourth factor—concerning a non-punitive purpose 
of the statute—was the “most significant factor” in its opinion.327 
However, it is notable that Judge Melloy reached the opposite conclusion 
by virtue of finding that residency restrictions were a form of banishment 
according to traditions and history in the United States.328 
The closeness of this issue under American law is a reason why the 
aggravating factors listed above are particularly important. If these laws 
actually create an “uncertainty effect,” much like the chilling of speech in 
free speech cases,329 the punitive effects of the statutes are much greater 
than the text of the laws might indicate. Similarly, if the race to the bottom 
 
 
 322. Doe II, 405 F.3d at 719 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 97). 
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 324. Id. However, the majority did so rather grudgingly. The court wrote: 
We agree with the district court that the law could have a deterrent effect, but we do not agree 
that the deterrent effect provides a strong inference that the restriction is punishment. The 
primary purpose of the law is not to alter the offender’s incentive structure by demonstrating 
the negative consequences that will flow from committing a sex offense. The Iowa statute is 
designed to reduce the likelihood of reoffense by limiting the offender’s temptation and 
reducing the opportunity to commit a new crime. We observe, moreover, that the Supreme 
Court has cautioned that this factor not be over-emphasized, for it can “prove[] too much,” as 
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continues, combined with an aggregation of statutes, then even the most 
unsympathetic judge may be forced to agree that sex offenders have been 
“banished” by a thousand different laws.  
A single exclusion zone, even one with a 5,000 foot diameter, is 
unlikely to be considered banishment by any American court under the 
law established by Doe v. Miller and various state opinions. The Iowa 
statute, for example, effectively banished offenders from the cities of Des 
Moines and Iowa City. Banishment from those cities is not unlike the 
ancient Athenian and Roman forms of banishment which would require a 
person to travel only a few miles to comply. In our modern era, with easy 
travel, being forced to move just a few miles probably does not rise to the 
level of “exile” in the eyes of most judges. However, with uncertainty, 
aggregation, and the emerging race to the bottom, seemingly minor 
relocation turns into actual banishment. 
While the courts have primarily focused on the analogy to banishment 
in their ex post facto analyses, a finding that the laws are punitive in effect 
would also bear on the outcome of other constitutional questions as well. 
Without a finding that a statute actually punishes an offender, a cruel and 
unusual punishment claim is sure to fail under the Eighth Amendment.330 
A double jeopardy challenge gains more traction if the Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez factors weigh in favor of the offender.331 If the sex 
offender is found to be actually banished, the court will be forced to 
address the substance of interstate332 and intrastate travel333 claims. 
Further, if a court determines that exclusion zones effectively banish 
defendants, a court may actually be forced to decide the muddled area of 
law about whether banishment as punishment is illegal. Thus, while the 
banishment analogy has been addressed by courts primarily as an ex post 
facto issue, a different finding on the comparison could alter the results of 
sex offender challenges on a variety of claims. 
E. Addressing Arguments for Residency Restrictions 
While legislative debates about the rationales for residency restrictions 
are often brief, there have been several arguments made in favor of 
restrictions that warrant attention. I address each of these arguments 
below. 
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1. Avoiding Temptation and Victim Grooming 
The most common rationale offered in support of these laws is that 
they prevent the temptation of sex offenders in their daily lives.334 The 
temptation argument is that sex offenders will not be around children, 
therefore they will not be tempted to commit a sex offense against them. A 
secondary, and probably more powerful, argument is that the presence of 
sex offenders in communities creates opportunities for those offenders to 
form linkages with potential victims, enabling their future crimes. This 
second argument is more potent because it acknowledges the 
overwhelming statistical evidence that child molesters are most often 
friends or family members of the victims.335 
While these arguments are facially appealing, they are flawed in 
several ways. Some of these shortcomings stem from design deficiencies 
in existing residency restriction programs, while others are inherent to an 
exclusion zone scheme. Ultimately, these rationales for residency 
restrictions fail to offer persuasive reasons for implementing exclusion 
zones. 
As currently designed, the inclusion of sex offenders who did not 
commit crimes against children demonstrates the flimsiness of these 
rationales. There is no empirical evidence to support the contention that a 
flasher,336 or other non-child-focused sex offender, is a high-risk candidate 
for sexually assaulting a child. In fact, someone guilty of a non-sex-based 
offense is a higher risk offender than many of those included under 
existing residency restriction schemes.337 The mismatch between targeted 
offender populations and those who actually pose some risk undermines 
the ability to focus efforts on offenders to ensure compliance with 
restrictions. The only existing residency restriction addressing this 
problem is the Arkansas law, which requires a particular finding of 
dangerousness. Without such a provision, the other nineteen state statutes 
 
 
 334. Singleton, supra note 174, at 610. 
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and countless local ordinances undermine the effectiveness of their laws 
through overinclusiveness. 
Further, insofar as these laws fall short of complete banishment from 
the United States, they only control the eight or so hours in which a sex 
offender is asleep—the hours when the risk of offense is essentially zero. 
There is no empirical evidence to suggest that residency restrictions are 
effective in limiting temptation. While removing offenders from schools 
keeps them away from large gatherings of children, the restrictions do not 
necessarily decrease the number of children in a sex offender’s 
neighborhood. In Ohio, for example, the state’s residency restrictions 
would result in a notable net increase in the number of children living in 
proximity to a sex offender.338 There is also no empirical support for the 
notion that there is a linear relationship between the number of children 
seen by a pedophile and the desire to re-offend. As a result, as long as an 
offender has some contact with children, the risk of temptation remains. 
Also, offenders are free to cultivate relationships with children who may 
not live near them, but may have other connections to the offender. 
Even without these design deficiencies, there is no empirical support 
for the idea that residency restrictions actually decrease sex offender 
recidivism. The Minnesota Department of Corrections explored the subject 
in depth and found no evidence that “residential proximity [of sex 
offenders] to a park or school” affects re-offense.339 Similarly, the 
Colorado State Judiciary Committees examined the efficacy of sex 
offender residency restrictions and found that, “[p]lacing restrictions on 
the location of . . . supervised sex offender residences may not deter the 
sex offender from re-offending and should not be considered as a method 
to control sexual offending recidivism.”340 After reviewing the effects of 
Iowa’s statute, the Iowa County Attorney’s Association found that, 
“[r]esearch does not support the belief that children are more likely to be 
victimized by strangers at the covered locations than at other places.”341 
 
 
 338. Singleton, supra note 174, at 612–13 (“Overall, the net effect of the twelve relocations was 
an increase of 2.97 children per acre. Although one might counter that being near a school provides a 
larger pool of potential victims, there’s nothing to stop determined child molesters from placing 
themselves in positions where they can have access to large numbers of children—regardless of 
whether or not the child molesters live nearby a school.”). 
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No study to date has shown any positive effect of these statutes in terms of 
decreasing recidivism.342 
The argument presented above in regards to reinforcing otherness bears 
on this argument as well. If offenders are forced into sex offender ghettos, 
their ability to form sex criminal networks and sex offender schools of 
crime are enhanced. Further, to the degree that offenders end up going 
underground, current probation officer and police monitoring is 
undermined.343 The result is that offenders have less supervision, not 
more. Further, the lack of positive social networks and treatment 
opportunities for sex offenders subject to residency restriction schemes 
means that the offenders will lack the resources to help them cope with 
temptation. Instead of having professional help, offenders under an 
aggressive residency restriction scheme are left to fend with their demons 
alone. Thus, even if residency restrictions create some positive effect on 
recidivism, the net effect is still likely to be an overall increase in re-
offending. 
2. Sex Offenders Deserve It 
Some have argued that concerns such as these are misplaced because of 
the heinous nature of the crimes committed by sex offenders.344 After all, 
these people are criminals who have committed some of the worst possible 
crimes—is it not justice to see them isolated from society? If we believe 
that sex offenders are the most vile criminals, then should not any 
punishment be acceptable? And of all the punishments available, including 
death or life in prison, banishment seems minor in comparison. 
This argument would have more merit if banishment were part of an 
offender’s original sentence or if a separate hearing with due process 
resulted in a new sentence of exile. However, none of these procedural 
protections exist under the current exclusion laws, with the notable 
exception of the Arkansas statute. The result is that, by legislative fiat, a 
class of persons is being banished from mainstream American society for 
life. There are no trials, no hearings, and no appeals. It is simply 
commanded and the sex offenders must comply. A failure to comply with 
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this brazen act of legislative power can result in a prison term of up to 
thirty years.345 
This argument also puts rationales in support of residency restrictions 
at odds with the judicial rationales finding these statutory schemes legal. 
As the decision in Doe v. Miller makes clear, a finding that the restrictions 
are regulatory and not punitive is the pivotal point for determining the 
legality of exclusion zones.346 If defenders of residency restrictions justify 
the laws by virtue of their harsh effect on offenders, that undermines the 
legal argument in favor of those restrictions. If retribution is the motive, 
then more due process is needed before someone receives a lifetime 
sentence of de facto banishment. 
Even beyond the procedural protections, however, the argument of just 
desserts represents a classic example of cutting off one’s nose to spite 
one’s face. Punishing offenders just for the sake of doing so may actually 
endanger children and increase recidivism. The discussion above 
illustrates the many ways in which residency restrictions are 
counterproductive. Adding retribution as an argument for exclusion zones 
will only blind policymakers from the real effects of these statutes. 
The just desserts argument is also substantially undermined by the 
enormous class of persons affected by these statutes. I have explained in 
detail the broad range of crimes that are covered by typical residency 
restrictions, so I will not repeat the argument here. The breadth of the class 
affected illustrates that any retribution-based deontological claim is 
fundamentally premised on spurious claims when a great number of 
offenders are substantially overpunished for their minor offenses.  
3. Sex Offender Ghettos are Actually Good 
One could argue that pushing offenders into communities like those 
that formed beyond the 101st kilometer in the Soviet Union might be a 
good thing. While this argument has not actually been advanced by 
defenders of residency restrictions, it is worth addressing. In defense of the 
development of sex offender communities, one might argue that such a 
development might actually facilitate law enforcement. Police may 
certainly know where to look for the “usual suspects” when initiating a sex 
offender investigation. 
However, it is unclear that police would gain any substantial advantage 
by having all sex offenders living in the same zip code. In the current 
 
 
 345. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2006). 
 346. See supra notes 210–17 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 101 Yung book pages .doc11/6/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
158 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:101 
 
 
 
 
system, probation officers and registry requirements already assure that 
most sex offenders are monitored and that police would know where to 
turn to find particular sex offenders.347 While there might be some 
advantage to being able to use community police techniques to monitor 
neighborhoods with a high concentration of sex offender residents, such an 
advantage is surely overwhelmed by the resultant increase in sex offenders 
going underground to escape exclusion zone requirements. 
I have also discussed the ways in which the formation of sex offender 
communities is actually counterproductive for law enforcement. Child 
pornographers are able to form networks and schools of crime can easily 
develop. Any benefits that are derived from having offenders in a known 
location are offset through the numerous ways criminal enforcement is 
undermined by the formation of sex offender ghettos.  
CONCLUSION 
We cannot banish dangers, but we can banish fears. 
—David Sarnoff348 
The use of class-based residency restrictions for sex offenders is a 
misguided approach to dealing with sex offender recidivism, one that 
sacrifices justice and liberty. Social, economic, and physical isolation 
creates an environment ripe for recidivism. While those supporting these 
laws have the interests of children at heart, the policies they are promoting 
will ultimately do more damage to children and society.  
Unfortunately, the political and cultural forces behind the crackdown 
on sex offenders are strong. While crime in general has long been an easy 
issue for politicians to gain support through the adoption of higher 
sentences, the situation with sex offenders has taken this political strategy 
to a new level. Sex offenders may be the single most despised population 
in the United States. Measures against them usually pass with little 
opposition. Stories of little girls and boys victimized by pedophiles go 
straight to the front pages of newspapers and dominate local news 
coverage. These forces make an intelligent debate about sex offenders a 
very difficult proposition. Without changes in the underlying attitudes that 
make sex offender crackdowns a no-lose issue for politicians, a 
reorientation of sex offender policy is unlikely. 
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Despite these obstacles, there are many alternatives available for 
policymakers opposed to an exile-centric approach to sex crimes. These 
solutions offer viable policy and litigation options for all levels of 
government. Eric Janus, among others, has forcefully argued for a public-
health approach to dealing with sex offenders.349 Such an approach 
eschews isolation and exile and focuses on assimilation, prevention, and 
reentry. A public health paradigm has the advantage of recognizing sexual 
violence within the context of the larger cultural environment while 
tailoring solutions to particular offenders (instead of class-based 
banishment).350 A public-health approach also allows treatment to be 
integrated into an effective sex offender policy.  
Any long-term solution to sexual violence needs to include a variety of 
policies tailored to individual offenders. If a limited banishment of a 
particular defendant could help decrease the risk of re-offense, then there 
are better ways to go about it than the current one-size-fits-all model of 
punishment. Nebraska, in particular, has started utilizing more refined 
dangerousness prediction tools to assess the particular risks of convicts.351 
I discussed earlier how Arkansas has managed to integrate risk assessment 
into a residency restriction policy.352 If judges were offered residency 
restrictions as a sentencing alternative and had access to the appropriate 
risk prediction tools, it would help limit banishment punishments to the 
few instances when it might actually be warranted. And it would allow the 
protected areas to be appropriately defined for a particular defendant. A 
serial statutory rapist, for example, may warrant a restriction against living 
near a high school, but may not warrant restrictions against proximity to a 
child care center.353 At the very least, such a scheme would offer the 
offender a chance to rebut the state’s rationales for seeking internal exile. 
Instead of a simple lifetime penalty, follow-up policies could play a 
role. In instances where there are clear indications that an offender is 
likely to re-offend, a judge could have the discretion to order regular 
hearings to screen offenders for rehabilitative progress as well as the risk 
of recidivism. Periodic risk assessments help to address the shortcomings 
of the existing predictive tools by evaluating offenders over a longer time 
frame than is usually available in the criminal justice system. 
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Instead of adopting the easy solution of class-based banishment and 
isolation, real progress in the fight against sexual violence requires a 
willingness to embrace a range of options. Sometimes, higher sentences 
may be warranted. Other times, probation and treatment might be 
preferable. And, in some instances, it is even possible that some form of 
exile may be part of a narrowly tailored package of punishment. 
Changing the fear and hysteria surrounding sex offenders is no small 
task. All that I can offer is the hope that eventually the facts of the issue 
will surface, eroding the various myths about the homogeneous class of 
“sex offenders” in the same way that modest gains have been made in 
dispelling rape myths among the general population. However, as 
experience demonstrates, cultural change is often slow and prone to 
regression. Only by fighting oversimplification of the sex offender debate 
can effective policies be adopted. Hopefully, this Article can play a role in 
combating those norms. 
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